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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 17, 2012, Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney
shut out reporters from a campaign fundraising event in Florida.'
Fortunately for the newspapers and blogs those reporters represented,
someone who did have a door pass to the insiders' event set up a video
camera out of plain view and recorded former Massachusetts
Governor Romney's now infamous "47 percent" speech.2 During that
speech, the presidential candidate made comments alleging that
nearly half of all Americans are dependent on government
entitlements and believe it is the government's responsibility to care
* J.D. Candidate, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, Class of 2014. Special
thanks to Louis A. Jacobs, Professor Emeritus of Law at The Ohio State University Moritz
College of Law, along with Christopher Meltzer, Holly Coats, and Nitya Lohitsa of the Ohio
State Law Journal for the insight they provided during the process of writing this Note. My
deepest thanks go to my wife, Kaitlin, for her never-ending love and support. This Note is
dedicated to our daughter, Olivia Mae, who was born during the editing process, and in
memory of two of the most influential people in my life, my grandparents Harley and
Donna Mae Strayer.
1 Brian Ross, Who Recorded Mitt Romney?, ABC: THE BLOTTEER (Sept. 18, 2012),
http://abenews.go.com/Blotter/recorded-
mittromney/story?id=17266676# .UGrdLUJ8vwx.
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for them.3 Mr. Romney's speech, to no surprise, did not move him any
closer to winning the presidency.4
But what could Mr. Romney do about it? Politically speaking,
probably not much. The damage was done the moment the speech hit
the Internet in a video released by Mother Jones magazine and
subsequently scattered in the blogosphere. In addition to the
mainstream media, blogs from The Daily Beast to The Hollywood
Gossip posted the video on their websites.6
Nevertheless, the surreptitious nature of the recording and the
method of its dissemination to the public sparked debate about its
3 Id.
4 Mr. Romney lost .6 points to President Obama in the New York Times' FiveThirtyEight
"now-cast" poll, which is a compilation of recent national and state polls, during the week
and a half after the "47 percent" video went viral. Nate Silver, Sept. 27: The Impact of the
'47 Percent', FIVETHIRTYEIGHT: NATE SILVER'S POL. CALCULUS (Sept. 28, 2012, 8:30 AM),
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.COm/2o12/o9/28/sept-27-the-impact-of-the-47-
percent/. Mr. Romney eventually lost the 2012 presidential election to incumbent Barack
Obama. 2012 Presidential Election Results, WASH. POST: CAMPAIGN 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/polities/election-map-2012/president/
(last updated Nov. 19, 2012). President Obama received 332 electoral -college votes and
50.6% of the popular vote, while Mr. Romney received 2o6 electoral-college votes and
47.8% of the popular vote. Id. The rest of the popular vote went to minor-party candidates.
Id.
5 David Corn, WATCH: Full Secret Video of Private Romney Fundraiser, MOTHER JONES
(Sept. 18, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://www.motherjones.Com/politics/2o12/o9/watch-full-
secret-video-private-romney-fundraiser (containing the unedited forty-nine-minute video
of Mr. Romney's "47 percent" speech).
6 See, e.g., Free Britney, Mitt Romney Stands By "47Percent" Comments: Will Video
DerailHis Campaign?, HOLLYWOOD GOSSIP (Sept. 18, 2012, 6:03 AM),
http://www.thehollywoodgossip.Com/212/o9/mitt-romney-stands-by-47-pereent-
comments-will-video-derail-his; Master Chief, Mitt Romney "47 Percent"--Full Video
Footage from Private Fundraiser Released, GOSSIPONTHIS.COM (Sept. 18, 2012),
http://gossiponthis.Com/2o12/o9/18/mitt-romney- 47-pereent-full-video-private-
fundraiser-released; Peter Kafka, Mitt Romney Goes Viral, ALL THINGS D (Sept. 18, 2012,
7:59 AM), http://allthingsd.Com/2o12o918/mitt-romney-goes-viral/; Mitt Romney's '47
Percent Disaster': A Campaign Killer?, WEEK (Sept. 18, 2012),
http://theweek.com/article/index/233456/mitt-romneys-47-pereent-disaster-a-
campaign-killer; James Braxton Peterson, Mitt Romney's 47 Percent Not Who GOP Wants
You to Think They Are, DAILY BEAST (Sept. 27, 2012, 4:45 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/27/mitt-romney-s-47-pereent-not-who-
gop-wants-you-to-think-they-are.html; Brandon K. Thorp, Off-Record Mitt Romney Says
'47Percent' of Americans Are 'Entitled': Video, TOWLEROAD (Sept. 16, 2012, 9:oo AM),
http://www.towleroad.Com/2o12/o9/off-record-mitt-romney-says-47-pereent-of-
americans-are-entitled-video.html (audio only).
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legality. This debate has centered on whether the recording violated
18 U.S.C. § 251o et seq. ("Wiretap Act") or the Florida wiretap statute.8
In a nutshell, these two statutes, along with similar state wiretapping
laws, prohibit the recording and dissemination of oral
communications when the speaker has a justifiable expectation that
his or her communications will not be intercepted.9 However, a much
larger question hovers overhead.
Assuming, arguendo, that such a surreptitious recording violated
the Wiretap Act and the Florida wiretapping statute,10 does the First
Amendment protect both the person who recorded Mr. Romney's
speech and the blogs that disseminated it? The Supreme Court has
stated that "generally applicable laws do not offend the First
Amendment simply because their enforcement . . .has incidental
effects on [the] ability to gather and report the news."" However, the
Court has also stated, "the First Amendment goes beyond protection
of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit
7 See, e.g., Jeffrey P. Hermes, A Camera Records in Boca, Part One, DIGITAL MEDIA L.
PROJECT, BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC'Y, HARV. U. (Sept. 20, 2012),
http://www.dmlp.org/blog/2012/camera-records-boca-part-one; Tony Romm, Mitt
Romney '47Percent' Recording May Have Been Illegal, POLITICO PRO (Sept. 18, 2012,
2:23 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/o92/81346.html.
8 Hermes, supra note 7; Romm, supra note 7. See also FLA. STAT. § 934.03 (2014).
9 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(2), 2511 (2014) (proscribing the interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communication, or disclosing the contents of such communication with at least a reason to
know that the information was intercepted in violation of the statute, and defining oral
communication as "any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation
that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such
expectation"); FLA. STAT. §§ 934.02(2), 934.03 (2014) (substantially tracking the federal
Wiretap Act's proscriptive provisions and definition of "oral communication").
10 This is not a cut-and-dry assumption to make, as this Note demonstrates infra in Part II.
11 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (concluding that holding a
newspaper liable for breach of contract under a state-law promissory estoppel theory for
reneging on a promise not to publish a confidential source's name did not violate the First
Amendment). The Supreme Court has, at times, had harsh words for news outlets accused
of violating generally applicable laws: 'The dissenting opinion suggests that the press
should not be subject to any law.., which in any fashion or to any degree limits or restricts
the press' right to report truthful information. The First Amendment does not grant the
press such limitless protection." Id. at 671. Good reasons exist to conclude, however, that
courts would consider bans on certain recordings to have more than incidental effects on
newsgathering, therefore falling outside the scope of Cohen. See Part III.C.2.
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government from limiting the stock of information from which
members of the public may draw." 2
The issue is much larger than Mr. Romney's gaffe. It is the titanic
struggle between "the right to know"'3 and "the right to be left
alone."' 4 Ergo, the battle is between the press's right to gather and
report information of public concern (i.e. newsworthy information)
and the rights of individuals in the public eye to maintain privacy in
their communications. Where the information pertains to a matter of
public concern uttered by a "public speaker,"'5 a civilized society ruled
by the will of the people demands that the law err on the side of
disclosure and transparency.
A general understanding in today's society presupposes that the
press is not limited to traditional news media outlets like newspapers
or radio stations but encompasses citizen journalists who gather and
distribute news. 6 In the highly connected world in which we live, it
takes only a matter of seconds for a person to record and disseminate
oral communications. Scenarios quickly come to mind where
12 First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
13 Supreme Court Justice William Douglas styled a "right to know" argument by reasoning
that "imbedded in the First Amendment is the philosophy that the people have the right to
know." Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 141 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 841 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[A]n absolute ban on
press interviews with specifically designated federal inmates is ... an unconstitutional
infringement on the public's right to know."). Justice Douglas has not cornered the market
on the phrase, however. Justice Harry Blackmun has also used it. Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 604 (198o) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (concurring in the
Court's holding that the First Amendment requires criminal trials to be open to the public
by arguing that the public has "an intense need and a deserved right to know" about the
process surrounding criminal trials).
14 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167 n.2 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (recognizing that a
general right to privacy, the "right to be let alone by other people," is left to state law);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (stating that
the right to be left alone is "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men." (internal citation omitted)).
15 The term "public speaker" is used here to describe public officials, candidates for public
office, and private persons who communicate about matters of public concern. Federal and
state high courts have recognized that candidates for public office and private persons who
are involved in public affairs have a diminished expectation of privacy similar to that of
public officials. See infra Part III.B.i.
i6 See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter's Privilege, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 515, 591 (2007) (arguing that "all those who disseminate information to the public"
should be treated as journalists); see also infra note 140.
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capturing information of vital public importance would be as easy as
pressing the "record" button on a smartphone. Take, for example, a
taxi cab driver who might record a conversation between two public
officials and deliver the recording to a newspaper, or, as an
entrepreneurial journalist herself, upload the recording to her blog. Or
consider a custodian who could eavesdrop on one end of a telephone
conversation between a union leader and management while
emptying wastebaskets in the room. Imagine that a restaurant waiter
to a private booth occupied by corporate officials overhears a
conversation about the relocation of a factory that would send the
community into an economic tailspin. The possibilities are endless. 7
Scenarios such as these have already presented themselves in
litigation over related issues concerning the Wiretap Act and the First
Amendment. For example, several high-profile cases have involved
citizen recordings of one specific type of public figure-police
officers. 8 Other notable cases in appellate courts have involved the
recording of public speaker communications, although these cases
have not decided the specific issue presented in this Note. 9 These
scenarios will only become more prevalent as smartphones and other
handheld devices capable of capturing audio and video become more
readily available and widely used.
The benefits of permitting the interception of communications in
such scenarios are twofold. First, the publication of such recordings
would give the public information needed to make decisions about
whom to vote for, where to shop, where to work, where to send their
children to school, which products to buy or not buy, and so forth.2"
Second, it would reduce the potential for collusive corruption in
17 This non-exclusive set of hypothetical situations is referred to infra as the "just-press-
record scenarios." These fact patterns are used throughout this Note to illustrate the
contours of the current rules and the application of proposed solutions to various
circumstances.
18 See infra notes 193-202 and accompanying text; see also Section 1983 Claims and the
Right to Record the Police, THE NEWSROOM LAW BLOG (May 2, 2011),
http://www.newsroomlawblog.com/articles/wiretapping- 1.
19 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518-19 (2001) (involving a cell phone
conversation about teachers' union negotiations that was intercepted by an unknown
person and provided to a radio station); Boehner v. McDermott, 441 F.3d 1OO, 1012 (D.C.
Cir. 2oo6) (involving a conference call between Representative John Boehner and then-
House Speaker Newt Gingrich recorded by private citizens using a police scanner). See
infra notes 131-134 and accompanying text for further discussion of these cases.
20 See infra Part IV.A.
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society's centers of power by putting public speakers on notice that
their communications could be recorded at any time. This would
increase transparency and reduce back-room deals entered into
without the public's knowledge but which have a detrimental effect on
the people.2
Thus far, scholarship on the legality of these recordings has
focused on the speaker.2 This Note provides a different perspective
focused properly on those who stand to benefit from the information
surreptitiously recorded: the general public. Part II examines the
Wiretap Act, considering its soundness and infirmities as applied to
the surreptitious recording and dissemination of information that, like
Mr. Romney's "47 percent" gaffe, raises a public concern. Part III
examines the First Amendment principles involved in the
surreptitious recording of public officials and private persons
communicating about matters of public concern (collectively "public
speakers"). While it would be ideal for courts to recognize a right to
receive information of public concern that trumps the diminished
privacy interests of public speakers, Part IV proposes that Congress
should update the Wiretap Act to reflect this constitutional principle
with an exception that would permit a person to press "record" when
that person (1) is lawfully on the premises where the recording takes
place, is not committing a crime, and is not otherwise violating a
relationship of trust and confidence; (2) reasonably recognizes, at the
time of the interception, that the communication pertains to a matter
of legitimate public concern; (3) distributes the information for the
public's benefit; and (4) does not seek to use the communication in an
act of bribery or extortion.
II. EXAMINING THE FEDERAL WIRETAP ACT
Exactly how the Wiretap Act,23 which governs the interception or
recording of oral communications, would be applied in the just-press-
record scenarios proposed herein is less than clear. The statute has
21 See infra Part IV.B.
22 See Meredith Regan, Note, All the World Wide Web is a Stage: Free Speech, Expressive
Association, and the Right to Choose Your Audience, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1119, 1121,1152 (2012)
(arguing that a First Amendment inquiry for the distribution of surreptitious recordings
should focus on the speaker's association interests and that the Supreme Court's public
concern test should be abandoned).
23 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (2012) (as amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986 ("ECPA")).
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been criticized for failing to keep pace with advancements in modern
audiovisual technology24 and its definition of oral communications-
the category of communications at issue in just-press-record
scenarios-is susceptible to variant judicial interpretations, making a
recorder's liability under the Wiretap Act dependent on the
jurisdiction.5 Moreover, the statute contains several exceptions,26 the
most notable of which requires a court to determine whether a party
to the communication consented to the interception and if the
interceptor possessed a criminal or tortious purpose.27 As discussed
below, the potential for inconsistent liability illustrates the
interpretive holes left by Congress and endangers the public's right to
receive information of legitimate public concern.28
A. History and Statutory Language
The Wiretap Act makes it unlawful to intercept wire, oral, or
electronic communications, or to disclose the contents of such
communications if the interceptor knows or has reason to know the
communication was intercepted in violation of the statute.29 The Act
24See infra notes 35-4o and accompanying text.
25 See infra Part II.B.
26 See i8 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)-(i).
27 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).
28 See infra Part IV.A.
29 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2014), the proscriptive provision of the Wiretap Act, provides in
pertinent part that:
[A]ny person who (a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures
any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or
electronic communication; ...
(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the
contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having
reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a
wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection; (d)
intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, oral, or
electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the
information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic
communication in violation of this subsection; ... shall be punished as provided
in subsection (4) or shall be subject to suit as provided in subsection (5).
2014]
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defines "intercept" as the "aural or other acquisition of the contents of
any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical, or other device."3 The Act defines "oral
communication" as that which is "uttered by a person exhibiting an
expectation that such communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying such an expectation."'"
The federal wiretap statute was first enacted in 1968 as Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.32 When it was first
passed, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary determined that the
statute's main purpose was to fight organized crime." It accomplished
this by "protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications" and
establishing the conditions that must be met for the interception of
such communications to be authorized.34
The Wiretap Act is an outdated statute regarding current
advancements in technology.35 Reflecting the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary's belief that the statute was "hopelessly out of date, 
3 6
Congress amended the Wiretap Act in 1986 to add "electronic
communication '3 to oral and wire communications. 38 Provisions
30 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2014).
31 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2014).
32 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat.
197, 211 (1968); see also Travis S. Triano, Note, Who Watches the Watchmen? Big
Brother's Use of Wiretap Statutes to Place Civilians in Timeout, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 389,
391 (2012).
33 S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 2157 (1968) ('The major purpose of [the federal wiretap law] is to
combat organized crime.").
34 S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 2153; see also Gelbard v. United States, 4o8 U.S. 41, 48 (1972).
35 See Triano, supra note 32, at 407.
36 S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 3556 ("[T]he existing law is 'hopelessly out of date.' ... It has not
kept pace with the development of communications and computer technology. Nor has it
kept pace with changes in the structure of the telecommunications industry."). The
Committee Report identified e-mail, cell phones, pagers, data sharing, and video
teleconferencing as communication mediums that were not then accounted for by the
statute. Id.
37 This amendment was known as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. In
addition to the ECPA, Congress added other electronic privacy provisions to the criminal
code, including the Stored Communications Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. The Wiretap
Act now defines "electronic communication" as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate
[Vol. 10:1
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directly addressing video and other communications that depict
images are still conspicuously absent, however, despite several
amendments to the Act since 1986.39 This fact is perplexing given that
most people have access to handheld video recording devices and
video surveillance is arguably more intrusive than the interception of
oral, wire, or electronic communications.40
Because an iPhone, video camera, or other handheld recording
device would qualify as a device capable of acquiring the contents of
an oral communication, liability under the Wiretap Act in just-press-
record scenarios would hinge on a court's construction of two key
provisions. One interpretive battle turns on the meaning of "oral
communication." More specifically, what circumstances justify a
speaker to expect that her communication will not be intercepted?
Federal courts have had trouble articulating a clear view of this
definition.4' A second interpretive difficulty arises under the Wiretap
Act's exception allowing the interception of communications with
"consent" from a party to the communication unless the interceptor
has a criminal or tortious purpose in violating the Constitution or
federal law.42
The Wiretap Act's susceptibility to variant interpretations would
likely chill the traditional press and potential citizen journalists from
gathering the newsworthy communications of public speakers when
or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). This definition excludes wire or oral
communications, communications through a tone-only paging device, communications
from a tracking device, or "electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial
institution in a communications system used for the electronic storage and transfer of
funds." Id. § 2510(12)(A)-(D).
3s Triano, supra note 32, at 407-08.
39 S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 3567 (1986); Triano, supra note 32, at 4o8. The Wiretap Act was
amended again in 1994, 1996, 2001, 2002, and 2oo8.
40 United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1437 (ioth Cir. 199o) ("We believe that the
interception of oral communications provides a strong analogy to video surveillance even
though video surveillance can be vastly more intrusive."); Triano, supra note 32, at 4o8 ("A
video recording captures everything but an individual's inner thoughts -physical
characteristics, gestures, and demeanor-far beyond the intrusion posed by an audio
recording.").
41 Cf. Nick J. Vizy, What Constitutes a Communication?-Expectation of Privacy, in
CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO WHITE COLLAR CRIME § 9.5 (2012) ("[M]ost cases are not.
.. clear-cut.").
42 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).
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uttered in circumstances less public than a press conference.
Consequently, the public's right to receive information regarding
matters of public concern could be infringed by public speakers
attempting to hide behind wiretapping laws.43
B. Susceptibility to Variant Judicial Interpretations
Federal appellate courts have established several tests for
determining what constitutes an "oral communication" under the
Wiretap Act that could lead to liability for the interception of oral
communications in some jurisdictions but not others. For example,
the Fourth Circuit's construction of the term places a person's
justifiable expectation that her communications will not be
intercepted on a sliding scale of suspicion.44 On that theory, a person
who knows for certain that her communication is being intercepted
has no reasonable expectation that her communication is private,
while a person who merely suspects that her communication is
possibly being monitored might still be justified in expecting that her
communication is private.45 As the court explained, "[at] some point
along the path of developing suspicion" a justified expectation of
privacy becomes unjustified.46 However, a justified expectation of
privacy does not become unjustified at the "first glimmer of
generalized suspicion that something could or might be amiss is
aroused. "
The Fifth Circuit takes a different approach. In Kee v. City of
Rowlett, Texas, that court held that persons speaking at a graveside
memorial service for children who had been murdered had no
expectation of privacy when police officers intercepted their
communications using an electronic surveillance microphone.48 After
43 See infra Part IV.A.
44 United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 849-50 (4th Cir. 1979).
45 Id. (affirming the conviction of a bank president who ordered and assisted his employees
in installing a hidden radio transmitter to monitor the conversations of IRS agents auditing
the bank).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Kee v. City of Rowlett, Tex., 247 F.3d 2o6, 2o8 (5th Cir. 2001). The communications
were those of the children's father and grandmother. Id. The children's mother was
charged and convicted of murdering them, id., which explains the relevance of the
communications and surveillance at the graveside service. The police officers obtained
2o6 [Vol. 10:1
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concluding that a speaker must demonstrate an "actual expectation of
privacy" in her communications for the interception to be actionable,49
the court articulated six factors to consider when determining whether
a speaker has such a subjective expectation of privacy:
1. [T]he volume of the communication or conversation;
2. [T]he proximity or potential of other individuals to
overhear the conversation;
3. [T]he potential for [the] communications to be
reported;
4. [T]he affirmative actions taken by the speakers to
shield their privacy;
5. [T]he need for technological enhancements to hear the
communications; and
6. [T]he place or location of the oral communications as it
relates to the subjective expectations of the individuals
who are communicating. 0
Applying this six-factor test to Mr. Romney's gaffe leaves a less-
than-clear picture about whether the person who set up the video
camera would face liability for the interception of an oral
communication under the Wiretap Act. The speech was loud enough
for donors attending the dinner to hear, presumably aided by the
permission from the cemetery to enter and conduct surveillance but did not obtain a
warrant or consent from the family to do so. Id.
49 The court applied a Fourth Amendment analysis, reasoning that government searches
and the Wiretap Act implicate the same interests. Kee, 247 F.3d at 211. This analysis
involved two questions: (i) whether the plaintiffs had demonstrated an "actual expectation
of privacy" and (2) "whether the individual's expectation of privacy is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable." Id. at 212. The court decided the case on the first
question but did not reach the second. Id. at 217. The court determined that the plaintiffs
had not demonstrated that they had a subjective expectation of privacy in their
communications because there were third parties and members of the media in close
proximity to the communications and the plaintiffs took no steps to preserve the privacy of
their communications. Id. at 216-17.
50 Kee, 247 F.3d at 213-15 (internal citations omitted) (acknowledging non-exclusivity of
these factors).
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amplification of a public address system, and thus no technological
enhancement like an electronic listening device was needed for the
communication to be heard.51 Mr. Romney's remarks were addressed
to the donors, but others, including caterers and waiters, were present
and would have been able to hear his speech.52 Further, the remarks
had the potential to be-and ultimately were-reported to the public.53
These factors suggest that Mr. Romney may not have had a subjective
expectation that his communications would remain private.
Unlike the memorial service that took place outdoors in the
presence of news media in Kee, however, Mr. Romney's gaffe was
uttered at a private campaign fundraising event from which reporters
had been deliberately excluded; Mr. Romney himself told reporters
they could not accompany him to the dinner.54 It is questionable how
much Mr. Romney tried to preserve the privacy of his
communications. After all, the video camera that recorded his speech
sat on a service table and ran without detection for more than forty-
nine minutes.55
While the Kee factors seem to point to the conclusion that Mr.
Romney had no subjective expectation of privacy in his speech,
application of the Duncan sliding scale analysis makes this conclusion
less clear. After all, Mr. Romney presumably did not know that his
speech was being recorded and likely did not even suspect as much.
This demonstrates how susceptible the Wiretap Act's definition of oral
communications is to variant interpretations. A person would likely be
liable under the Wiretap Act for recording Mr. Romney's speech in
some jurisdictions but not others.
51 In Kee, the court alluded that only technological enhancements of the sense of hearing
are relevant to this inquiry. Kee, 247 F.3d at 217. Indeed, the court considered this to be the
strongest factor in favor of the plaintiffs' ability to demonstrate a subjective expectation of
privacy. Id. This makes sense since a person speaking into a microphone would know that
his voice is being amplified. His subjective expectation of privacy would thus be
diminished. On the other hand, he would not know, for example, that a person in a van in
the parking lot was listening to his speech using an ultrasonic receiver.
52 See Ross, supra note 1.
53 See supra notes 7 and 8 and accompanying text.
54 Ross, supra note 1.
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Applying the Kee factors or Duncan test56 to other just-press-
record scenarios would produce results that are even less consistent.
For example, a technological enhancement would not be needed for a
taxi cab driver to overhear the conversation of two public officials
sitting in her back seat even though the volume of the communication
would be less than a speech to a room full of donors. Only the cab
driver would be in close enough proximity to overhear the
conversation, but the potential would still exist for the conversation to
be reported to the public. Likewise, the public officials would not
know with certainty that their conversation was being recorded. Even
if they suspected as much, they would not likely have a high level of
suspicion. Thus, the susceptibility of the Wiretap Act's definition of
oral communication presents the opportunity for a public speaker to
cry foul when a slip of his tongue is recorded and published. This
could chill reporters and citizen journalists from gathering this
information. The public's right to receive information of public
concern should not depend on the jurisdiction they are in.57
C. Exceptions to the Statutory Language
The Wiretap Act contains several exceptions.58 Most relevant to
the oral communications at issue in just-press-record scenarios, the
Act does not proscribe interceptions by parties to the communication
or persons with consent from one party to the communication if the
interception is not committed with a criminal or tortious purpose.59
56 Use of these approaches is not meant to suggest that Kee and Duncan are the only tests
used by the federal courts, but merely to illustrate variance among the circuits and the
inadequacy of the Wiretap Act as it is currently drafted to protect the right of the public to
receive information of public concern.
57 See infra Part IV.A.
58 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)-(i). These provisions except from liability (i) interceptions
conducted by employees of providers of wire or electronic communication services while in
the normal course of their employment or pursuant to a court order, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(2)(a)(i)-(ii); (2) interceptions conducted by law enforcement pursuant to consent or
as part of a lawful investigation, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(C), (i); and (3) interceptions conducted
by government officials in gathering foreign intelligence, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(e) -(f) -only
to name a few. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) for a list of all Wiretap Act exceptions.
59 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (providing that a person "not acting under color of law" will not be
liable under the Wiretap Act for the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic
communication when that person is a party to the communication or a party to the
communication has consented to the interception "unless such communication is
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Commentators have asked whether the person who recorded Mr.
Romney's "47 percent" speech was a party to the communication or
implicitly gave consent to the interception.60 However, at least one
federal court has read consent narrowly to exclude "knowledge of the
capability of monitoring. " 61
This debate illustrates the interpretive holes left by the Wiretap
Act's language and its inadequacy in addressing modern technological
advancements. Moreover, the inclusion of nine exceptions (not
counting subsections) demonstrates Congress's intent that the
proscriptive provisions of the Wiretap Act should not operate as a
hard rule of liability in all circumstances. While the canon of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius62 would weigh against judicial
interpretations that would find a statutory exception for the
interception of oral communications in just-press-record scenarios,
Congress is not constrained from enacting such an exception. If
Congress has been willing to include nine exceptions to the statute
thus far, there is no reason to think that it could not pass another
exception to the statutory prohibitions.
Simply put, the Wiretap Act fails to draw an acceptable line
between the diminished-but at times admittedly legitimate-privacy
expectations of public speakers and the First Amendment right of the
public to receive information of public importance.63 The statute's
intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State").
6o Hermes, supra note 7. If the person who recorded the speech was an invited donor, then
he or she would likely be considered a party to the communication. Id. If that person was
part of the catering staff, then Mr. Romney could argue that he or she was not an intended
recipient, was not a party to the communication, and did not have consent to record from a
party to the communication. Id.
61 Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581 (iith Cir. 1983) (emphasis in original)
(reasoning that consent under the Wiretap Act cannot be "cavalierly implied" and that it
would "thwart" Congress's "strong purpose to protect individual privacy" if consent could
easily be implied from the circumstances).
62 See United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 357 (1988) (translating this canon
as "the expression of one is the exclusion of others"). According to this long-used canon of
statutory construction, Congress's enumeration of certain words, provisions, or exceptions
in a statute suggests that Congress did not intend to include other words, provisions, or
exceptions that it did not choose to express. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, .JR., ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 854 (4th ed.
2007).
63 See infra Part IV.A.
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less-than-clear definition of "oral communication" and its statutory
exceptions create the potential for public speakers to attempt to hide
behind this ambiguity. Courts might also interpret the current
provisions in a way that unconstitutionally infringes the public's right
to receive information about their governing officials and other
matters critical to fulfilling their roles as voters, consumers, parents,
employees, and the like. Congress should eliminate this incongruity by
amending the Wiretap Act to include an exception for recordings of
oral communications by public speakers in just-press-record
scenarios.64
64 While this Note directly addresses only the federal wiretap statute, state legislatures
should follow suit and amend their wiretap laws to include an exception similar to the one
proposed herein. If the Wiretap Act produces interpretive difficulties, then current state
laws result in a veritable quagmire for the courts regarding the surreptitious recording of
oral communication by public speakers. That at least forty-nine of the fifty states have
wiretap statutes is perhaps the single consistency regarding restriction of electronic
surveillance at the state level. See Electronic Surveillance Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/electronic-
surveillance-laws.aspx (last updated Mar. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Electronic Surveillance
Laws]. The District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands also have their own
wiretap statutes. Id. The lone holdout is Vermont, although that state's supreme court has
held that the recording or monitoring of a communication in a person's home is a violation
of privacy laws. Id.
Forty states and territories have statutes that, like the Wiretap Act, are one-party
consent statutes, meaning that interceptions of communications will not result in liability
when at least one party to the communication consents to the interception, even if that
person is the interceptor. Id. Ohio has a one-party consent statute that substantially tracks
the Wiretap Act regarding the provisions at issue herein. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2933.52 (West 2014); see also Electronic Surveillance Laws, supra. Twelve states and
territories have all-party consent statutes, meaning that every party to the communication
must consent for the exception to apply and for the interceptor to avoid liability. Electronic
Surveillance Laws, supra. These all-party consent statutes are more restrictive. Illinois, an
all-party consent state, has the most restrictive wiretap statute, proscribing the use of an
"eavesdropping device" to hear or record "all or any part of a conversation." 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/14-2(a)(1) (2014) (stating that a person violates the statute when he "[k]nowingly
and intentionally uses an eavesdropping device for the purpose of hearing or recording all
or any part of any conversation ... unless he does so (A) with the consent of all of the
parties to such conversation or electronic communication."); Marianne F. Kies, Note,
Policing the Police: Freedom of the Press, the Right to Privacy, and Civilian Recordings of
Police Activity, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 274, 287 (2011). The Supreme Court of Illinois,
however, recently held that this statute is unconstitutionally overbroad. People v. Melongo,
No. 114852, 2014 IL 114852, 31 (Ill. Mar. 20, 2014). Florida, where the video recording of
Mr. Romney's "47 percent" speech took place, is an all-party consent state. See FLA. STAT. §
934.03(2) (d) (2014) ("It is lawful ... for a person to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication when all of the parties to the communication have given prior consent to
such interception.").
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III. APPLYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO
JUST-PRESS-RECORD SCENARIOS
The Wiretap Act is aimed at protecting the privacy of
communications. While tension exists between the rights of privacy
and a free press, the two are not mutually exclusive.65 Both are
"plainly rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our
society."66 The freedom of the press is expressly grounded in the First
Amendment, 67 while the right to privacy is not explicitly mentioned in
Unlike the Wiretap Act, forty-four state statutes include some proscription for
interceptions of video or photo communications. Electronic Surveillance Laws, supra.
Some statutes expressly prohibit such interceptions only in certain circumstances. For
example, Alaska and Missouri forbid the interception of video or photo communications
when nudity is involved. Id. Similarly, the South Carolina Code of Laws includes a "peeping
tom" provision in a separate section than its wiretap statute that proscribes, among other
conduct, using audiovisual equipment to invade the privacy of others. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
17-470(A) (2013); see also Electronic Surveillance Laws, supra. Interestingly, this statute
does not apply to "any bona fide news gathering activities," making it less of an obstacle to
the recording of oral communications by public speakers. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-
470(E)(5). Courts in Massachusetts have determined that the state's statute applies when a
person secretly records video if audio is also captured. Massachusetts Recording Law,
DIGITAL MEDIA L. PROJECT, BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & Soc'y, HARV. U.,
http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/massachusetts-recording-law (last updated July 31,
2012); see also MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 272, § 99 (2014).
Like the Wiretap Act, these state statutes are inadequate to ensure that the public will
receive the information it needs to make informed choices. Given the importance of the
public's right to receive information of public importance and the diminished privacy
expectation of public speakers, state legislatures should follow suit with Congress by
amending their wiretap statutes to include an exception for interceptions in just-press-
record scenarios.
65 See Hoepker v. Kruger, 2oo F. Supp. 2d 340, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Briscoe v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34, 42 (Cal. 1971) (en bane) ("[T]he rights guaranteed by the
First Amendment do not require total abrogation of the right to privacy."). In Briscoe, the
Supreme Court of California held that a man who brought an invasion of privacy claim
against a magazine for publishing "truthful but embarrassing" facts about his prior
criminal activity had stated a cause of action, concluding that to succeed the plaintiff must
prove that "the publisher invaded his privacy with reckless disregard for the fact that
reasonable men would find the invasion highly offensive." 483 P.2d at 36, 44. The Supreme
Court of California overruled Briscoe's specific application of the First Amendment and the
invasion of privacy tort in Gates v. Discovery Comme'ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552, 555 (Cal.
2004). However, nothing in Gates indicates that the broad proposition quoted herein was
questioned.
66 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
67 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
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the Constitution. 68 Instead, it has liberally been read into the "liberty"
protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
by the Supreme Court and includes, but is not limited to, the right to
privacy in raising children, sexual relations, marriage, and the
cessation of medical treatment.69 These constitutionally recognized
privacy interests are different, however, than privacy in information or
communication.
Courts are split about the existence of a constitutional right to
privacy in information,7O which seems the most closely connected to
the Wiretap Act's protection against the interception of oral
communication where the speaker has a justifiable expectation that
such communication is not subject to interception. Indeed, the D.C.
Circuit has "grave doubts" about whether a constitutional right to
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.").
68 Doug Linder, The Right of Privacy, EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/rightofprivacy.html (last visited
Apr. 4, 2014) (website maintained by Doug Linder, professor of law at the University of
Missouri-Kansas City Law School). See also generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
578 (2003) (protecting private homosexual activity between consenting adults); Cruzan v.
Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284 (1990) (cessation of medical treatment); Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (family structure); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (possession of obscene material in the home); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (marital privacy). In addition, the Supreme
Court has recognized that the right to privacy may serve as a conduit to free speech since
"the fear of public disclosure of private conversations might well have a chilling effect on
private speech." Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001).
69 Linder, supra note 68.
70 See Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 756 n.9 (2011). Some
jurisdictions have used a balancing test for disclosures of certain categories of information
that weighs the government interests against the person's privacy interest, id. (citing In re
Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1999); Woodland v. City of Hous., 940 F.2d 134,138
(5th Cir. 1991); Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Phila., 812 F.2d 105, 11o
(3d Cir. 1987); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983); State v.
Russo, 790 A.2d 1132, 1147-50 (Conn. 2002)), while another has held that a right to
privacy in information applies only to invasions of interests which are fundamental or
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," id. (citing J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d lo8o, lo9o
(6th Cir. i98f)). The Supreme Court declined an opportunity to squarely decide this issue
in Nelson. 131 S. Ct. at 751 ("We assume, without deciding, that the Constitution protects a
privacy right of the sort mentioned in Whalen and Nixon. We hold, however, that the
challenged portions of the Government's background check do not violate this right in the
present case.").
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privacy in information exists.71 Another court has concluded that "the
verdict on informational privacy is an unequivocal 'who knows."'72
While the common law of most jurisdictions had recognized a
general right of privacy by the mid-1970s,73 this is not a
constitutionally protected interest. In Katz v. United States, the
Supreme Court reasoned that the Constitution does not protect a
general right of privacy between private persons, but that "a person's
general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other people-is..
left largely to the law of the individual States."74 The Court's
determination that the Constitution does not protect a general privacy
interest between private citizens suggests the subordinate nature of
privacy protections when pitted against the First Amendment.
In contrast, the Supreme Court has said that a broad reading of
the First Amendment's protection for a free press is necessary to
"assure[] the maintenance of our political system and an open
society."75 Illustrating the superiority of the First Amendment, the
drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts interpreted Supreme
Court precedent to conclude that a cause of action for an invasion of
privacy would not overcome the protections necessary for a free press
when the subject of a published statement challenged in court is a
matter of "legitimate concern to the public."76 The Restatement
presumes that the broad constitutional definition of "legitimate
concern to the public" preempts narrower state definitions.77
71 Am. Fed'n of Govt Employees v. HUD, 118 F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
72 Elkins v. Elenz, No. 8:11-cv-2817-T-23AEP, 2012 WL 2952435, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July
19, 2012).
73 See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 488-89 (1975) (discussing the prevalence of
courts' recognition of a right to privacy in U.S. jurisdictions).
74 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348, 350-51 (1967) (footnote omitted) (concluding
that the government violated the Fourth Amendment by installing an electronic recording
device in a telephone booth and intercepting a person's conversations).
75 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967) (remanding an award of damages to consider
First Amendment principles for a family who obtained a verdict against Time, Inc.,
publisher of Life Magazine, for publishing what they claimed was an inaccurate depiction
of an ordeal wherein they were held hostage in their home by three convicts for nineteen
hours).
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d (1977) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 492).
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How broadly should the courts read the First Amendment? To
evaluate the application of the First Amendment to just-press-record
scenarios, one must understand constitutional protections for the
tenets of a free press: newsgathering 8 and publication. Before delving
into those topics, however, two questions must be answered. First,
what, exactly, is a matter of legitimate public concern? Second, where
should courts draw the line between a legitimate public concern and a
public speaker's legitimate privacy interests in her communications?
A. Matters of Legitimate Public Concern
The Supreme Court has reasoned that speech regarding matters of
legitimate public concern is "at the heart of the First Amendment's
protection."9 To be sure, the Constitution does not limit publicly
important matters to discussion of politics or public affairs.8o Rather,
the concept encompasses "all issues about which information is
needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with
the exigencies of their period."' 1 For example, the Court has reasoned
that the line between information and entertainment is too "elusive"
to afford proper protection to a free press,8 2 implying that courts
should err on the side of concluding that a matter pertains to a
legitimate public concern rather than not.
While the Supreme Court has noted that the public-concern test is
"not well defined,"83 the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
may have said it best when describing the scope of matters of
legitimate public concern:
78 The interception of oral communications in just-press -record scenarios is an act of
newsgathering.
79 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 776 (1978)).
80 Time, 385 U.S. at 388 (concluding that an article about a play based on actual events
concerning three convicts who took a family hostage in their own home was a matter of
public concern).
8i Id. (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (194o)).
82 Id. (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,510 (1948)).
83 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011).
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The scope of a matter of legitimate concern to the
public is not limited to "news," in the sense of reports
of current events or activities. It extends also to the use
of names, likenesses or facts in giving information to
the public for purposes of education, amusement or
enlightenment, when the public may reasonably be
expected to have a legitimate interest in what is
published.8 4
Supreme Court jurisprudence has created two primary strands of
cases in which courts have distinguished between matters of public
and private concern,8 5 but the test for what constitutes a matter of
public concern overlaps both lines of cases.8 6 One strand holds that
government employers may restrict speech by public employees
unless the employee is speaking as a "citizen upon matters of public
concern."8 7 To determine whether speech pertains to a matter of
public concern, the Court has instructed lower courts to take into
account the entire record and consider three factors: the speech's
content, the form in which it was presented, and the context in which
it was uttered. 88 The Supreme Court perhaps provided its most
concrete definition of "public concern" in City of San Diego, Cal. v.
84 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. j (1977). The Restatement drafters
grounded this characterization of public concern in constitutional terms, citing the
Supreme Court's decision in Cox Broadcasting. Id. § 652D cmt. d. The drafters further
clarified this characterization by stating that matters "customarily regarded as 'news' fall
within the scope of public concern. Id. § 652D cmt. g. Quite unsurprisingly, such news
includes reports of homicides, natural disasters, fires, rare diseases, and the like. Id.
However, the drafters also included other examples illustrating the broad scope of public
concern, e.g. marriages and divorces, a police report about the escape of a wild animal, and
even a twelve-year-old girl who gave birth. Id. The drafters concluded that matters of
legitimate public concern include "matters of genuine, even if more or less deplorable,
popular appeal." Id. (emphasis added).
85 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049,
1095 (2000).
86 See infra, notes 87-95.
87 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983) (holding that an assistant district
attorney's distribution of a questionnaire concerning the office's transfer policy to
colleagues was not speech about a matter of public concern and that her termination did
not violate the First Amendment).
88Id. at 147.
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Roe, when it stated that a matter of public concern is one that "is a
subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest
and of value and concern to the public at the time of publication. "89
The other application of the public-concern test appears in
defamation cases where no showing of "actual malice" has been found,
holding that the First Amendment does not proscribe recovery of
presumed and punitive damages in such cases when the defamatory
remarks are not about "matters of public concern."9o This rule first
appeared in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders,91 which
adopted the content-form-context rule applied in the public employee
speech cases. 92 In 2011, the Court completed the melding of the tests
from the public employee and defamation lines of cases when it held
that the First Amendment protects a speaker from state tort liability
when he speaks on matters of public concern. 93 The Court stated that
speech pertains to a public concern when it can "be fairly considered
as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community, or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is,
a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public."94
89 City of San Diego, Cal. v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004) (holding that a police officer
who made a video of himself performing sexually explicit acts in a police uniform had not
engaged in an expression of public concern and thus he could not prevail on a claim that
his termination from employment violated the First Amendment). The Court also
recognized that "certain private remarks ... touch on matters of public concern." Id. at 84
(citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386 (1987)).
90 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (plurality
opinion). In Dun &Bradstreet, the Court concluded that a contractor's credit report was
not a matter of public concern because "it was speech solely in the individual interest of the
speaker and its specific business audience" and thus a credit reporting agency did not
receive special protection from punitive damages in a defamation suit when it sent the
report to several of its subscribers. Id. at 762. The Court reasoned that the agency's
dissemination of the report was "solely motivated by the desire for profit" and was "more
objectively verifiable than speech deserving of greater protection." Id. The Court concluded
that this speech was "wholly false and clearly damaging to the victim's business
reputation." Id.
91 See Volokh, supra note 85, at 1o96.
92 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 (plurality opinion).
93 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (citing cases from both the public employee
and defamation cases and holding that members of the Westboro Baptist Church could not
be liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress when they picketed at military
funerals with signs that contained inflammatory messages relating to the military's
position regarding homosexuality).
94 Id. at 1216 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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The Court also noted that neither the content, form, nor context is
dispositive; "it is necessary to evaluate all the circumstances of the
speech, including what was said, where it was said, and how it was
said."95
The public-concern test has been criticized as applied in both lines
of cases, mostly because it is "so potentially broad and so vague" that
its susceptibility to variant interpretations has produced inconsistent
results.96 One critic characterized the public-concern test as "both
vague to the point of indeterminacy and extremely broad."97 The
content-form-context test has been criticized as "virtually
guarantee[ing] that the inquiry will be both unpredictable and little
related to the phrase 'public concern."'"9 This vagueness has resulted
in confusion and inconsistency in the lower courts and threatens a
spillover of government restriction on speech by citizens who are not
public employees.99
While a case-by-case analysis would apparently be needed to
determine whether communications intercepted in just-press-record
scenarios regard matters of legitimate public concern, the scenarios
presented herein would easily fall within the scope of courts'
articulation of the principle. Consider the recording of Mr. Romney's
"47 percent" speech. The Supreme Court has stated in unequivocal
language that because speech is a mechanism of accountability, "[t]he
First Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application to speech
uttered during a campaign for political office."100 Because Mr.
95 Id.
96 See Volokh, supra note 85, at 1095-98 for a description of cases that have and have not
found speech to be matters of public concern.
97 Volokh, supra note 85, at 1097; see also Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion:
The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43 (1988);
Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First
Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 n.40, 34, 45 (1990).
98 Volokh, supra note 85, at 1097.
99 Cf. Volokh, supra note 85, at 1097. Examples of this inconsistency include decisions by
lower federal courts finding that criticism of the operations of a public university
department, accusations of race discrimination, and layoffs by the FBI are not matters of
public concern, while cases on similar facts in other jurisdictions have come to the opposite
conclusions. Id. (internal citations omitted).
100 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223
(1989)).
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Romney's speech was made to a group of potential donors and
included remarks relevant to his fitness as president, there is little, if
any, question that the subject of his speech was a matter of public
concern.
Moreover, the Court has explicitly considered union negotiations
to be matters of public concern;101 thus, the custodian's recording of a
union leader's end of a telephone conversation while emptying waste
baskets would involve a matter of public concern. Lastly, the Court has
held that a newspaper that published the name of a rape victim could
not be held liable because the story involved a matter of public
concern: the commission and investigation of a violent crime.102 Given
this broad conclusion, a waiter's recording of a restaurant meeting
between corporate and government officials about the closing of a
factory that employs many of a community's residents certainly would
fall within the broad scope of public concern.
But defining matters of legitimate public concern answers only
half the question. The First Amendment and privacy interests, while at
odds, must exist side-by-side in a society that values both.103 Indeed,
the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the First Amendment itself
protects a person's legitimate privacy interests in some
circumstances.104 The Supreme Court has subjected both First
Amendment and privacy interests to a balancing test in other
101 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (concluding that months-long teachers'
union negotiations concerning teacher compensation were "unquestionably a matter of
public concern").
102 Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 536-37 (1989); see also Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1975) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits a state from
prescribing civil liability for a television station that broadcasts the name of a juvenile
victim of a rape-murder when that name was garnered from public records). In the same
vein, the Court has held that publishing the name of an alleged juvenile offender named in
public records is protected. See, e.g., Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Okla. Cnty. Dist. Court, 430 U.S.
308, 311 (1977); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).
103 See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34, 42 (Cal. 1971) (en bane) ("[T]he
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment do not require total abrogation of the right to
privacy."), holding overruled by Gates v. Discovery Comme'ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552, 555 (Cal.
2004).
104 Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 929 (9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that the First
Amendment "no doubt" entails a right of privacy that includes "a right to make personal
decisions and a right to keep personal matters private," but denying that such a right had
been violated by the termination of a police officer who ran a pornographic website
featuring his wife).
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contexts.10 5 Thus, to better understand the scope of matters involving
a legitimate public concern, those concerns must be compared with
the privacy interests of public speakers.
B. The Line Between Legitimate Public Concern and Legitimate
Privacy Interest
A public speaker's legitimate claim to privacy in her
communications is less than the average citizen.10 6 That does not
mean, however, that public speakers have no justifiable expectation of
privacy in their communications. The line between a legitimate public
concern and a public speaker's legitimate privacy interest can be a
tricky one to draw. For example, would a government official speaking
to her assistant in a hushed tone in the halls of a government office
building about a piece of controversial legislation she planned to
propose have a legitimate expectation of privacy in that
communication? What if the subject of the communication was about
her son, who was dying of a rare disease? What if this conversation
took place in the foyer of her office? Would it be private then? Before
drawing this line, one must understand a public speaker's diminished
expectation of privacy.
1. Diminished Expectation of Privacy for Public Speakers
The Supreme Court and state high courts have recognized a
diminished expectation of privacy for public officials.107 This
105 See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667-77 (1989)
(balancing an employee's Fourth Amendment privacy interests in not submitting to a urine
test against a government employer's interest in obtaining information about its
employees' drug use); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,150-54 (1983) (balancing the
"interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees"); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968) (same).
1o6 See infra Part III.B.i.
107 See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1964) ("[W]here the criticism is of
public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is
overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of
truth."); George W. Prescott Publ'g Co. v. Register of Probate for Norfolk Cnty., 479 N.E.2d
658, 662 (Mass. 1985) ("[A] public official has a significantly diminished privacy interest
with respect to information relevant to the conduct of his office.").
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diminished expectation of privacy has been extended to candidates for
public officelo 8 and even to private persons who are not government
officials or candidates but who involve themselves in public affairs.19
Even the Restatement (Second) of Torts chapter on invasions of
privacy has acknowledged this diminished expectation.11o
Although not in the context of personal privacy, the Supreme
Court has treated "public officials" and "public figures" as one in the
same for First Amendment purposes.1 As Chief Justice Earl Warren
concurred in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the distinction between
the public and private sectors is becoming increasingly "blurred."112
Thus, Chief Justice Warren concluded that distinguishing between
public officials and public figures has "no basis in law, logic, or First
Amendment policy."113 The four-justice plurality in Curtis Publishing
Co., in which Chief Justice Warren did not join but did not disagree
with on this point, provided a definition of public figure that roughly
1o8 Lambert v. Belknap Cnty. Convention, 949 A.2d 709, 718 (N.H. 2008) ("[A] candidate's
decision to apply for an elected public office places his or her qualifications for that office
at issue .... Thus, a candidate voluntarily seeking to fill an elected public office has a
diminished privacy expectation in personal information relevant to that office.").
109 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001) (applying the principle that an "attendant
loss of privacy" is a consequence of involvement in public affairs to teachers' union
representatives and reasoning that privacy interests "give way" to the public interest in
disseminating matters of public importance). Justice Breyer, writing in concurrence, also
recognized that the teachers' union president and chief negotiator were "limited public
figures" because they had "voluntarily engaged in a public controversy." Id. at 539 (Breyer,
J., concurring). Accordingly, "[t]hey thereby subjected themselves to somewhat greater
public scrutiny and had a lesser interest in privacy than an individual engaged in purely
private affairs." Id.
11o RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977) (recognizing that the publication
of information about a public figure "is not limited to the particular events that arouse the
interest of the public," and that such publicity "may legitimately extend, to some
reasonable degree, to further information concerning the individual and to facts about him,
which are not public and which, in the case of one who had not become a public figure,
would be regarded as an invasion of his purely private life").
- See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967) (plurality opinion) (holding
that to prevail on a defamation claim a public figure must prove that the challenged
statement was false, substantially endangered her reputation, and the publisher engaged in
"highly unreasonable conduct" that was an "extreme departure" from the investigation and
reporting standards of a responsible publisher).
112 Curtis Publ'g Co., 388 U.S. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
113 Id.
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translates to a private citizen who involves himself in public affairs.
The Court provided that public figures are persons who "command[] a
substantial amount of independent public interest" at the time a
statement challenged in a libel suit is published.114
A citizen may be considered a public figure based on a position of
importance or by "purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of his
personality into the 'vortex' of an important public controversy. '"115
The communicators in just-press-record scenarios would be public
figures under these definitions. Public officials in the rear seat of a
taxicab and Mr. Romney, as a presidential candidate, undoubtedly
would have a diminished expectation of privacy due to their positions
of importance. The same would apply to a corporate officer who, like
the athletic director in Curtis Publishing Co., would constitute a
public figure by way of his position with the corporation. Finally, a
union leader would be a public figure via both her position of
importance and the "thrusting" of her personality into a controversy of
legitimate public concern.116
Thus, on a continuum bookended by First Amendment protections
for expressions regarding matters of legitimate public concern and a
person's legitimate privacy interests in communication, the privacy
interests of public speakers falls farther down the line toward First
Amendment protection. Indeed, the Supreme Court has reasoned that
one cannot escape the risk of exposing his private life to others to
some degree in a civilized society.117 The Court implied that this risk is
worthwhile to protect a free press and all the benefits it entails: "The
risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which
places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press."11s Where to
draw this line for public speakers is the next inquiry.
114 Id. at 154 (plurality opinion).
115 Id. at 155. The Court applied these principles to conclude that a university athletic
director employed by a private corporation and a private citizen who possessed no official
position of importance, but who was a political activist and had deliberately inserted
himself into public affairs by commanding a rioting crowd against a group of federal
marshals, were both public figures. Id. at 135, 140, 154.
ii6 See supra note 101.
117 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967). The plaintiffs in that case were a family who
were taken hostage by three escaped convicts in their own home. Id. at 536. By holding that
the First Amendment protected the publication of an article about the plaintiffs' ordeal, id.
at 542-43, the Court implied that this risk of exposure applies to all persons, not just those
who involve themselves in public affairs.
11 Id. at 542.
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2. Drawing a (Fuzzy) Line
Drawing this line is not a question of where a public speaker's
constitutional right to privacy begins. The Supreme Court in Katz
made clear that the Constitution does not provide a right of privacy
between persons.11 9 Rather, this is a question of where First
Amendment protection for gathering and distributing information
regarding matters of legitimate public concern ends and the statutory
proscription for intercepting oral communications begins.
There can be no question that public speakers maintain a
legitimate privacy interest in matters of their personal lives that are
unconnected to actions taken in their official capacity and that this
extends to their personal communications.12o Equally clear, however,
is that public speakers, by placing themselves in the spotlight,
surrender some of their private reputation and character to public
scrutiny.121 Indeed, a public official has no legitimate expectation that
a personal attribute relevant to her fitness for office will not be
published, even if exposure of that attribute would detrimentally
119 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
120 Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 425, 457, 465 (1977). In Nixon, the Supreme
Court took up an invasion of privacy claim brought by former President Richard Nixon that
was grounded in the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. Id. at 455. The Court
considered several factors in concluding that President Nixon could not prevail on that
claim where the release to him of his personal papers and effects that were commingled
with forty-two million documents and 880 tape recordings was subject to a statutory
screening process. Id. at 456. The Court addressed (i) the extent to which the screening
process intruded on the privacy of President Nixon's personal communications, (2)
President Nixon's status as a public figure, (3) his lack of privacy interest in a majority of
the documents and recordings, (4) the public interest in preserving the documents and
recordings, and (5) the impossibility of separating his personal communications from the
rest of the materials. Id. at 465. The Court concluded that President Nixon had a legitimate
privacy expectation in his commingled personal communications, but that the screening
process did not violate that privacy interest. Id. Nixon, however, is only marginally relevant
to just-press-record scenarios. Indeed, that case did not involve communications that were
obtained in violation of a statute or a claim that publication of the materials violated
President Nixon's privacy interests, but whether the carrying out of a statutory screening
process before releasing personal papers and affects was an invasion of privacy. Id. at 456.
121 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P.
281, 291 (Kan. 19o8) ("Manifestly a candidate must surrender to public scrutiny and
discussion so much of his private character as affects his fitness for office.")); see also Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 777 n.3 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that public figures "assume the risk of rough treatment by entering
the public arena").
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affect her private reputation.122 In addition, this rule extends to the
publication of truthful facts about the "dress, speech, habits, and the
ordinary aspects of personality" of a person who, although without the
status of a public official, "has achieved, or has had thrust upon him,
the... status of 'public figure."'123
Once again, the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts may
have provided the most succinct articulation of the amorphous line
between matters of legitimate public concern and a public speaker's
legitimate privacy interest in the personal details of his or her life:
The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be
the giving of information to which the public is entitled,
and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into
private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable
member of the public, with decent standards, would
say that he had no concern. The limitations, in other
words, are those of common decency, having due
regard to the freedom of the press and its reasonable
leeway to choose what it will tell the public, but also
due regard to the feelings of the individual and the
harm that will be done to him by the exposure.12 4
Wherever this rule draws the line, it seems to indicate that Mr.
Romney would not be able to succeed on a claim for an invasion of
privacy for the publication of comments he made during his speech.
After all, his comments did not pertain to matters of his personal life
unconnected to his official capacity, and his statements to potential
campaign donors were germane to his fitness for public office. 125
Indeed, nearly half the country's population lumped into Mr.
Romney's "47 percent" group, who he claimed expect to live off
122 See Garrison, 379 U.S. at 77 (explaining that attributes such as "dishonesty,
malfeasance, or improper motivation" are germane to an official's fitness for public office
and are subject to public scrutiny).
123 Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 8o6, 8o9 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding that a former child
prodigy in mathematics who took steps to maintain his privacy and seclusion later in life
could not prevail on state constitutional and common law claims of invasion of privacy for
the publication of biographical information about him as an adult in The New Yorker
magazine).
124 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977) (emphasis added).
125 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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government entitlements, may have found his comments to be
dishonest and improper.126 The same can be said for the other just-
press-record scenarios presented herein. For example, the truthful
publication of facts about collusion by public officials undertaken in
their official capacities while sitting in the back seat of a taxi cab
would not seem to invoke a legitimate privacy interest.
But this does not answer the question of whether the interception
of communications by public speakers violates a legitimate privacy
interest. The cases and Restatement cited above address only the
publication of such communications. While some courts have used a
Fourth Amendment "reasonable expectation of privacy" analysis to
determine liability under the Wiretap Act,12 7 the reasonableness of a
public speaker's general privacy interest is not the subject of the Act's
definition of oral communication. The statutory language varies
slightly by defining oral communications as those "uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such an expectation."12
This definition targets newsgathering activities such as the
interception of oral communications rather than the publication of
intercepted communications. As noted, this definition is susceptible to
variant interpretations; Mr. Romney's gaffe might fall under this
definition in some jurisdictions but not others.129
Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated that a "clear dichotomy"
exists between an interceptor of oral communications and one who
publishes that communication, if not the same person or entity.13o In
126 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
127 See, e.g., Kee v. City of Rowlett, Tex., 247 F.3d 206, 211 (5th Cir. 2001).
128 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2).
129 See supra Part II.B (discussing tests established in multiple jurisdictions to determine
the circumstances in which speech is an oral communication under the Wiretap Act). Mr.
Romney's speech is but one example of a just-press-record scenario where a public speaker
would be tempted to invoke the Wiretap Act retrospectively as a sword and prospectively as
a shield to chill others from recording his communications regarding matters of legitimate
public concern. Despite public speakers' diminished expectations of privacy, other just-
press-record scenarios presented herein arguably involve more justifiable expectations by
public speakers that his or her communications will not be intercepted than a speech to a
room full of donors at a private campaign fundraising event. Thus, the Wiretap Act, a
statute aimed at criminalizing the interception of oral communications, is unreliable to
provide proper limitations on liability for interceptors in just-press-record scenarios and
constitutional protections embodied in the First Amendment must be relied upon.
130 Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 464
n.28 (2001).
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its most recent decision interpreting the Wiretap Act, Bartnicki v.
Vopper,131 the Court implicitly left open the question of whether the
First Amendment would ever protect the interceptions of oral
communications. There, the Court held that, under the First
Amendment, a newspaper or other media entity cannot be held liable
for publishing communications intercepted in violation of the Wiretap
Act, even if the media entity knew or had reason to know that the
information was obtained in violation of the statute, as long as the
media entity did not participate in the interception.132 The Court
assumed without deciding that the interception involved in that case-
the interception of a cellular phone call between a union's president
and chief negotiator by an unknown interceptor-violated the Wiretap
Act. 33 First Amendment protection for the interceptor, however, was
not an issue before the Court.134
131 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 539 (2001).
132 Id. at 532.
133 Id. at 518, 529.
134 In the same term as Bartnicki, the Court vacated a decision of the D.C. Circuit holding
that a congressman had violated the Wiretap Act when he disclosed to a newspaper the
contents of a telephone conversation provided to him by private persons who intercepted
that conversation in violation of the Wiretap Act,, and that the congressman had no First
Amendment protection for that disclosure. McDermott v. Boehner, 532 U.S. 1050 (2001);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) (prohibiting the disclosure of communications when the
person knows or has reason to know that the communication was intercepted in violation
of the statute). The Court instructed the circuit court to reconsider its holding in light of
Bartnicki. Id. On remand, the D.C. Circuit affirmed its original conclusion that Rep.
McDermott was liable under the Wiretap Act for his disclosure of the intercepted
communication. Boehner v. McDermott, 441 F.3d 1oo, ioi6-17 (D.C. Cir. 2oo6). The
court vacated its judgment, however, and granted reconsideration en banc. On rehearing,
the court affirmed its prior holding, but on the very narrow ground that the First
Amendment did not protect Rep. McDermott because his position on the House Ethics
Committee-and rules governing that committee-imposed a duty not to disclose the
intercepted communication. Boehner v. McDermott, 484 F.3d 573, 58o-8i (D.C. Cir.
2007) ("When Representative McDermott became a member of the Ethics Committee, he
voluntarily accepted a duty of confidentiality that covered his receipt and handling of the
Martins' illegal recording. He therefore had no First Amendment right to disclose the tape
to the media."), cert. denied McDermott v. Boehner, 552 U.S. 1072 (2007). At most, the
D.C. Circuit's en bane decision stands for the proposition that the First Amendment vill
not protect a person who discloses an intercepted communication if some other rule
imposes a duty of nondisclosure based on a duty of trust and confidence. That is not the
case in any of the just-press -record scenarios presented herein. By negative implication,
the decision could also signal that courts are unwilling to affirmatively hold that the First
Amendment does not protect the interceptors of oral communications in all circumstances.
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Protections for newsgathering and the public's right to receive
information of legitimate public concern uttered by public speakers
should tip the balance away from liability for interceptions in just-
press-record scenarios. Congress need not wait for the Supreme Court
to explicitly so hold, nor should it. Indeed, there would be no issue for
judicial resolution if Congress adopted the amendment proposed
herein because the Court would be bound to follow the express
language of the statute and no constitutional violation would be at
issue.135
Although courts generally regard protections for newsgathering
and publication as distinct, with newsgathering holding a less-revered
shelf on the rack of constitutional protections, the line between the
two protected activities is less than clear.136 On a theoretical level,
newsgathering is rightly considered a "prerequisite" to publication.137
Since the purportedly more-protected activity-publishing-cannot
result without the so-called less-protected activity-newsgathering-it
would seem logical that protections for the latter must be at least as
great as that of the former. Moreover, the practical lines between
publishing and newsgathering are murky. For example, if a reporter
determines that a story cannot be published for lack of accuracy, that
reporter incurs a duty to either abstain from publishing or continue
gathering facts until the story is fit for publication.13 8 Nevertheless, the
Court has treated protections for newsgathering as a separate inquiry.
Because liability for the publication of the communications of Mr.
Romney's speech and other public figures in just-press-record
scenarios is not seriously at issue,139 only newsgathering will be
addressed in detail.
135 See infra Part IV.C for the language of this proposed amendment.
136 Eric B. Easton, Two Wrongs Mock a Right: Overcoming the Cohen Maledicta That Bar
First Amendment Protection for Newsgathering, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1135, 1140, 1143 (1997).
137 Id. at 1140.
138 Id. at 1143-44.
139 Despite the Wiretap Act's proscription against disclosing communications obtained
unlawfully when the disclosing party knows or has reason to know the communication was
intercepted in violation of the statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c), liability for the publication
of Mr. Romney's speech and communications intercepted in other just-press-record
scenarios is not seriously at issue. The Supreme Court has recognized the press's right to
publish information notwithstanding whether the information was obtained lawfully or
unlawfully, even if the media entity knew or had reason to know the information was
obtained unlawfully, as long as that media entity played no part in illegally obtaining the
information. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526-27, 532 (2001); Smith v. Daily Mail
2014]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 10:1
C. Protections for Newsgathering
Two issues arise regarding First Amendment protections for
newsgathering. First, who can be afforded those newsgathering
protections, or in other words, who counts as a journalist in the
Constitution's eyes?140 Second, what activity can be protected as
Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (holding that a statute proscribing the publication of a
juvenile offender's name violated the First Amendment where newspaper had been
prosecuted). In Bartnicki, the Court extended the Daily Mail rule in two important ways:
(i) first, it applied the rule to a radio broadcast, not a newspaper, thereby extending the
rule's application outside the traditional "press"; and (2) it held that a state cannot punish
a newspaper for publishing even unlawfully obtained information that it knew or should
have known to be unlawfully obtained as long as it did not contribute to the unlawful
acquisition of the information. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526-27, 532 (applying the Daily Mail
rule to a radio show that broadcasted audio of a cell phone conversation about labor
negotiations for a teachers' union intercepted by a third party and given to the radio
station). The First Circuit has applied this rule to websites. See Jean v. Mass. State Police,
492 F.3d 24, 24 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding that facts were "materially indistinguishable" from
Bartnicki where an activist posted video on a website while knowing or having reason to
know that the recording was obtained illegally; thus, the court found that the activist would
likely succeed on a First Amendment claim).
Stephanie Frazee's effect-based approach to classifications of websites as journalism is
a sound rule for extending Bartnicki to all websites that "enhance[] freedom of individual
opinions and beliefs and contribute[] to the free flow of opinion and reporting." Stephanie
J. Frazee, Bloggers as Reporters: An Effect-Based Approach to First Amendment
Protections in a New Age of Information Dissemination, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 6O9,
625, 639 (2OO6) ("Regardless of the medium through which information is disseminated,
or the process or intent behind its production and dissemination, if information enhances
freedom of individual opinions and beliefs and contributes to the free flow of opinion and
reporting, it should be protected. Thus, some bloggers will be protected, but not all will.").
Thus, it seems that a website that posted video of the "47 percent" speech was on solid
ground.
140 Anyone with access to a recording device such as a smartphone should be deemed a
journalist. This idea has gained traction as traditional news entities have cut staff and
relied more on "citizen journalists." Papandrea, supra note 16, at 521-32. Papandrea
argues that "all those who disseminate information to the public" should be deemed
journalists. Id. at 591. The federal appellate courts are split, but most concede that
"journalist" is not limited to reporters at formal news entities. Several circuits have held
that citizen reporters can be the "press," but to be a "journalist," one must have the intent
to distribute the information prior to making a recording. See, e.g., Kies, supra note 64, at
293 (citing Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 7o8, 714-15 (1st Cir. 1998); In re
Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 129-30 (3d Cir. 1998) (adding the requirement that the person
must be gathering news or doing investigative journalism); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289,
1293 (9th Cir. 1993); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142-45 (2d Cir. 1987)). Other
circuits have held that a person should be regarded as a journalist if the information being
gathered is valuable to the public. See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011)
("The First Amendment right to gather news is ... not one that inures solely to the benefit
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newsgathering? Newsgathering's status as activity, not speech,141 begs
an interesting question. If newsgathering is activity, not speech, and
sits on a lower rung of constitutional protection than other protected
activity under the First Amendment, but is a prerequisite to one of
these higher protected activities, namely publication, then how is a
court to ensure that a citizen is able to carry out the higher-protected
activity? Put another way, would limiting the scope of protection for
newsgathering unconstitutionally restrict citizens from fully carrying
out their so-called higher First Amendment rights of publication?142
This is a question that has been only moderately answered and with
less than ideal clarity.143
1. General Newsgathering Principles Under the First Amendment
To be sure, newsgathering has some protection under the First
Amendment.144 The Court has styled this as a "right of access" or a
of the news media; rather, the public's right of access to information is coextensive with
that of the press."); Kies, supra note 64, at 293 (citing Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d
1332, 1333 (iith Cir. 2000) (reasoning that "a right to record matters of public interest" is
encompassed under the First Amendment); lacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 24-25 (1st
Cir. 1999) (recognizing an independent journalist's constitutional right to videotape a
public meeting)). Considering the current practice in the news industry and the availability
of tools used in newsgathering to the public, the sounder reasoning would afford a wide
protection for persons who may be considered journalists beyond the traditional press
commensurate with Papandrea's conclusion.
141 Easton, supra note 136, at 1141. But see ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 602-03 (7th Cir.
2012) (categorizing an audiovisual recorder as a vehicle of expression and concluding that
the Illinois wiretap statute "is directly leveled against the expressive element of an
expressive activity").
142 The Supreme Court itself has pointed out this anomaly: 'The explicit, guaranteed rights
to speak and to publish concerning what takes place at a trial would lose much meaning if
access to observe the trial could.., be foreclosed arbitrarily." Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576-77 (198o) (holding that the First Amendment protects the
right of the press to attend trials).
143 Easton, supra note 136, at 1141.
144 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 4o8 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) ("Nor is it suggested that news
gathering [sic] does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection
for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."); id. at 728 n.4
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965), for the
implication that newsgathering receives some protection: "[T]he right to speak and publish
does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information." (emphasis added)).
2014]
IS: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
"right to gather information. '"145 But even in Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, a "watershed case" in which the Court for the first
time directly held that the activity of gathering newsworthy
information is protected by the Constitution,146 this right of access
went only as far as protecting the same access for journalists as that of
regular citizens.47 Moreover, while reasoning that journalists "remain
free to seek news from any source by means within the law," the Court
in Branzburg v. Hayes listed other limitations on the right to gather
news.148 A journalist may not "invade the rights and liberties of
others" when carrying out his newsgathering function.149 Journalists
may be shut out from certain meetings of government and private
bodies, such as grand jury proceedings, Supreme Court conferences,
and meetings conducted in executive session.5o Presumably this
would extend to exclusions from attendance at campaign fundraising
events on private property. Likewise, reporters may be forced to
remain behind police lines at the scene of a crime or other disaster,
just like regular citizens.151
One of the Court's most restrictive opinions on the right to gather
news came down in Zemel v. Rusk.152 In Zemel, a U.S. citizen applied
for a passport to travel to Cuba-which at that time was cut off from
diplomatic relations with the United States-on the ground that he
was curious about the "state of affairs in Cuba" and sought to be a
145 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576 (citing cases).
146 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring) ('Today, however, for
the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary interference with access to
important information is an abridgement of the freedoms of speech and of the press
protected by the First Amendment.").
147 Id. at 577-80. Justice Brennan concurred, but wrote that the press may have a greater
right of access in order to serve its role as an agent of the general public. Id. at 586 n.2
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("As a practical matter, however, the institutional press is the
likely, and fitting, chief beneficiary of a right of access because it serves as the 'agent' of
interested citizens, and funnels information about trials to a large number of individuals.").
148 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682-85.
149 Id. at 683 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)).
15o Id. at 684.
151 Id. at 684-85.
152 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
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"better informed citizen."153 The Court agreed that the Secretary of
State's refusal to validate the citizen's passport for travel to Cuba cut
back on the "free flow of information. '"154 But despite the argument
that Zemel was not a true newsgathering case,1 55 the Court's opinion
contained sweeping language that seemed to be directed at
newsgathering activities. The Court reasoned that the Secretary's
refusal to validate Zemel's passport was an "inhibition of action," not
speech, and that "[t]here are few restrictions on action which could
not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data
flow."15 6 The Court concluded that the First Amendment rights of
speech and publication do not include the "unrestrained right to
gather information. '"157 This conclusion seems unwarranted since
Zemel did not purport to be a journalist and freely admitted that he
sought to gather the information for purely personal reasons.153
But Zemel did not carve back on the First Amendment protections
for newsgathering as much as the Court's later decision in Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co.159 In an opinion characterized by one commentator
as "maledicta,"160 the Court held that the First Amendment does not
prevent the application of generally applicable laws to the press when
those laws have only incidental effects on newsgathering. 6 The case
153Id. at 4.
154 Id. at 16.
155 Easton, supra note 136, at 1148. Zemel was not a reporter and the Secretary had issued a
press release stating that exceptions to the passport ban would be made for journalists,
among others "whose travel maybe regarded as in the best interests of the United States."
Zemnel, 381 U.S. at 3.
,56 Zernel, 381 U.S. at 16-17.
157 Id. at 17.
158 Id. at 3. Zemel originally applied for travel to Cuba as a tourist, then changed his reason
after his first application was denied. Id. His second application stated that he wanted to
travel to Cuba "to satisfy my curiosity about the state of affairs in Cuba and to make me a
better informed citizen." Id.
159 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
i60 See Easton, supra note 136, at 1139.
i6i Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670. In so holding, the Court concluded that finding a newspaper
liable for breach of contract under a promissory estoppel theory for reneging on a promise
not to publish a source's name did not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 671 (rejecting
the dissenting opinion's argument that any law that would limit or restrict the press's
"right to report truthful information" violates the First Amendment).
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has been criticized as derailing the natural progression of First
Amendment protections for newsgathering.162 Nevertheless, because
Cohen is the current law as articulated by the Supreme Court, any
argument for the protection of a particular newsgathering activity
must navigate its holding by demonstrating that a restriction of the
activity would have more than an incidental effect on
newsgathering.163
2. Not (Cohen)cidental: Applying Newsgathering Principles to
Wiretapping Laws
This is where the rubber meets the road. The Wiretap Act and its
state analogues are laws of general applicability.164 If the Act's
restriction on the interception of oral communications has only
incidental effects on newsgathering, then according to Cohen it is not
an unconstitutional limitation on a free press under the First
Amendment. The Court in Bartnicki, however, did not consider
whether the Wiretap Act had direct or incidental effects on
newsgathering. In fact, only one federal appellate court has considered
the issue. While the Fifth Circuit in Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc.
concluded that the Wiretap Act and Texas wiretap statutes have only
incidental effects on newsgathering, 65 the court's reasoning was less
than convincing.
The Fifth Circuit considered claims brought by a school trustee
against two parties: (1) his neighbor for using a police scanner to
record conversations he conducted using his cordless telephone and
162 Easton, supra note 136, at 1138.
163 An earlier decision of the Court also reasoned that reporters could not violate "valid
criminal laws" in the name of newsgathering. Branzburg v. Hayes, 4o8 U.S. 665, 691
(1972). In that case, the Court explicitly listed "private wiretapping" as one criminal act not
protected by the First Amendment. Id. This Note does not suggest, however, that Congress
should amend the Wiretap Act to exempt all interceptions of private oral communications.
The narrow exception proposed herein would apply only to interceptions of public
speakers' oral communications in limited circumstances due to public speakers'
diminished expectation of privacy. See supra Part III.B.i.
164 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001) (finding that that Wiretap Act and its
Pennsylvania analog are laws of general applicability). The Pennsylvania statute in effect at
that time provided that a person whose communication was "intercepted, disclosed or used
in violation of this chapter shall have a civil cause of action against any person who
intercepts, discloses or uses or procures any other person to intercept, disclose or use, such
communication." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5725(a) (1988).
165 Peavyv. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158, 191 (5th Cir. 2000).
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(2) a television station for reporting the contents of those
conversations, which dealt with public corruption in the school
system.166 The court rejected the television station's argument that the
Wiretap Act directly affects newsgathering because it "completely
proscribe[s] use and disclosure of all contents of interceptions. '"167 The
court reasoned that the television station interpreted the Act too
broadly because it restricts only the means by which information is
acquired. 68 Because the defendants could have acquired the
information contained in the intercepted communications from other
sources, the Act's effect on newsgathering was only incidental.1 69
The Fifth Circuit's narrow interpretation jeopardizes the public's
ability to receive information of public concern by limiting it to the
chance circumstances that communications concerning backroom
deals will voluntarily be made public. "Incidental" is defined as
"accompanying but not a major part of something" or "occurring by
chance in connection with something else."17o In each just-press-
record scenario, prohibiting the recording of communications
involving a matter of public concern would result in more than a
"chance" effect on newsgathering. Such proscription would likely
prevent the information from ever being gathered and thus deprive
the public of receiving information necessary to fully carry out their
roles as voters, consumers, parents, employees, and the like. Indeed, it
would be by "chance" only that a reporter would ever procure that
information. No reporter, regardless of any intention to record, was
admitted to Mr. Romney's fundraising event. The public's ability to
learn about Romney's views of the "47 percent" should not have been
left to the chance event that an attendee would leak details to the
press. Regarding another just-press-record scenario, reporters might
never learn of collusion in City Hall unless a taxi cab driver records
the back-seat conversation of two public officials. To say, as Peavy
does, that the generally applicable Wiretap Act has only incidental
effects on newsgathering because a reporter might or might not be
able to gain access to the information by other means leaves the
166 Id. at 163-67.
167Id. at 191 (emphasis in original).
168Peavy, 221 F.3d at 191.
169 Id.
170 NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 878 (3d ed. 2010).
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public's ability to receive critical information to chance and
"eviscerate[s]" the public's First Amendment rights.171
This conclusion was reflected in 2012 when the Seventh Circuit
issued its opinion in the case of ACLUv. Alvarez.72 Although that case
dealt with a state wiretap statute more restrictive than the Wiretap
Act,173 the action was the same: the recording of oral communications
uttered by public figures.174 The court concluded that regardless of
whether the Illinois statute was generally applicable, "it should be
clear by now that its effect on First Amendment interests is far from
incidental."175 Of critical importance, the court characterized the
audiovisual recorder at issue as a vehicle of expression and reasoned
that the statute "is directly leveled against the expressive element of
an expressive activity."7 6 Therefore, the statute directly affected the
First Amendment rights of the ACLU's members.177
Moreover, Cohen and earlier cases limiting constitutional
protections for newsgathering are distinguishable. Similar to the list
171 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 4o8 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) ("[W]ithout some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374, 389 (1967) (First Amendment "guarantees are not for the benefit of the press so
much as for the benefit of all of us").
172 ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 602-03, 608 (7th Cir. 2012) (concluding that an
organization with a program to record video of police activity would have a "strong
likelihood" of succeeding on a First Amendment claim that the Illinois wiretap statute as
applied to that program would be unconstitutional).
173 The Illinois wiretap statute, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1 et seq. (2014), prohibits the
audiovisual recording of any oral communication without consent even if the
communication was not intended to be private. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 595. The Supreme
Court of Illinois recently held that this statute is unconstitutionally overbroad. People v.
Melongo, No. 114852, 2014 IL 114852, 31 (Ill. Mar. 20, 2014).
174 The audiovisual recording of police activity was the challenged action in Alvarez. 679
F.3d at 586.
175 Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 602.
176 Id. The court elaborated that the act of recording the police activity was "antecedent" to
publication, and thus the right to publish would be "insecure" or "largely ineffective" if not
for the right to record. Id. at 595-96. The court concluded, "the eavesdropping statute
operates at the front end of the speech process by restricting the use of a common, indeed
ubiquitous, instrument of communication. Restricting the use of an audio or audiovisual
recording device suppresses speech just as effectively as restricting the dissemination of
the resulting recording." Id. at 596.
177Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 602.
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provided in Branzburg,178 Cohen itself considered only one group of
generally applicable laws that had any bearing on newsgathering:
trespassing, breaking and entering, and robbery.179 The Court made
the rather unremarkable statement that the press may not invoke the
First Amendment to justify breaking into an office to gather news. 8o
But breaking and entering and pressing record on a smartphone when
a person finds herself in the right place at the right time do not have
the same level of culpability. Only two other generally applicable laws
cited by Cohen are even loosely related to journalism activities:
responding to a grand jury subpoena and publishing copyrighted
materials without following the relevant laws.181 The other laws cited
by the Court-employment laws, antitrust laws, and tax laws-dealt
with a news media entity as a business and had no relation to
newsgathering activities. 8 2
Regarding the opinions holding that the press has no greater right
of access than the general public, interceptors in just-press-record
scenarios would presumably either be journalists or members of the
general public who find themselves in the right place at the right time;
no heightened right of access would be needed. Moreover, the
interceptor would not necessarily "invade the rights and liberties" of
the communicator, as was the concern in Associated Press v. NLRB,183
because of the diminished expectation of privacy held by public
speakers. 84 Lastly, Zemel was not a "bona fide newsgathering case."185
Because Zemel was not a journalist, had no interest in gathering
information for public benefit, and a press release stated that
journalists would likely be exempted from proscriptions against
178 See supra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.
179 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991).
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669. The Seventh Circuit has agreed with this analysis. See Alvarez,
679 F.3d at 6o (reasoning that Cohen and Branzburg involved legal sanctions that were
"not aimed at the exercise of speech or press rights as such").
183 See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937).
184 See supra Part III.B.i.
185 Easton, supra note 136, at 1148.
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passports into Cuba,18 6 Zemel should not be understood as applicable
to newsgathering at large. Therefore, these decisions limiting
protections for newsgathering should not be viewed as impediments
to the First Amendment protections for intercepting communications
in just-press-record scenarios. The Wiretap Act and its state
analogues, while generally applicable laws, are not the type of
generally applicable laws contemplated by the Court in Cohen due to
the fact that wiretapping laws directly affect newsgathering activities.
3. Confirming the Distinguishability of Cohen:
Recent Appellate Decisions
A trio of relatively recent federal appellate cases suggests the
soundness of concluding that Cohen and earlier cases limiting
protections for newsgathering activities do not prevent protection for
interceptors in just-press-record scenarios. In Desnick v. American
Broadcasting Co., the Seventh Circuit's then-Chief Judge Richard
Posner did not consider Cohen to be problematic for a defendant
television network on a claim brought under the Wiretap Act and a
state wiretap law.187 The case involved an appeal from a dismissal for
failure to state a claim and held that a news entity would not be liable
for invasion of privacy, wiretap, or other general state laws where
reporters posed as customers and secretly videotaped activities inside
an eye clinic using hidden cameras. 88 Chief Judge Posner cited Cohen
seemingly as an afterthought and only for the narrow proposition that
the press is not immune from general contract and tort liability. 8 9
Posner's opinion regarding the electronic surveillance claims
turned largely on statutory interpretation, not constitutional law, as
the "testers" were parties to the recorded communications and were
therefore exempt from liability under the Wiretap Act.19o That
exemption, however, applies only if the recording was not done with a
criminal or tortious purpose. 91 To that end, Chief Judge Posner's
186 See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1965).
187 Desnick v. Am. Broad. Co., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995).
188 Id. at 1348, 1353.
189 Id. at 1355; see also Easton, supra note 136, at 1200-04.
19o Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1353.
191 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (stating that a person will not be liable under the Wiretap Act if
that person is a party to the communication or has consent from a party to the
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reasoning resounded with underlying First Amendment principles,
implying that the activity of gathering information regarding matters
of public concern is not a criminal or tortious act:
[The testers' purpose] was not to injure the Desnick
Eye Center, unless the public exposure of misconduct is
an "injurious act" within the meaning of the Wisconsin
statute. Telling the world the truth about a Medicare
fraud is hardly what the framers of the statute could
have had in mind in forbidding a person to record his
own conversations if he was trying to commit an
"injurious act."192
In similar regard, the past three years have seen the First and
Seventh Circuits hold that a citizen who records police activity
occurring in the open is within her First Amendment right to gather
and distribute information about government officials.193 Because
police officers are one type of public figure, these cases support an
expansion of newsgathering protections for the recording of oral
communication by all public speakers.194
In Glik v. Cunniffe, the First Circuit held that "a citizen's right to
film government officials" in a public space is "a basic, vital, and well-
established liberty" under the First Amendment.195 The plaintiff had
been arrested and prosecuted under the Massachusetts wiretap
statute for recording an arrest that he believed involved an excessive
use of force at the Boston Commons.9 6 After the criminal case was
communication "unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing
any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or
of any State").
192 Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1353-54.
193 See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (st Cir. 2011); ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 6o8
(7th Cir. 2012).
194 Admittedly, both cases dealt with state statutes more restrictive than the Wiretap Act:
the Massachusetts and Illinois wiretap statutes. See MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 272, § 99(B)(4)
(2011) (requiring the consent of all parties to the communication before interception
occurs); Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 595; Glik, 655 F.3d at 8o.
195 Glik, 655 F.3d at 85.
196 Id. at 79-8o. The criminal court dismissed all charges, noting that the fact the officers
did not like being recorded did not turn "the lawful exercise of a First Amendment right"
into a crime. Id. at 8o.
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dismissed, Glik filed suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of his
First Amendment rights, and the district court denied the
government's motion to dismiss on qualified immunity.197 The First
Circuit affirmed, concluding that the officers had violated Glik's First
Amendment rights and that those rights were clearly established at
the time of the officers' conduct, implying that such a conclusion was
"self-evident. 
"198
Likewise, in ACLU v. Alvarez, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
the ACLU had a "strong likelihood" of succeeding on the merits of its
claim that the Illinois wiretap statute would violate its members' First
Amendment rights to record police activity as part of a police
accountability program.1 99 The ACLU filed a pre-enforcement action
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the prosecution of
ACLU members implementing the organization's program of making
audiovisual recordings of police officers in action around Chicago.200
The court determined the statute was content-neutral and thus
applied intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny.201 The
statute did not pass muster. Because the police accountability
program was designed to record police activity in the open, the court
did not think the alleged public interest of "conversational privacy" in
police communications and the tailoring between the statute's means
and ends justified the infringement on the ACLU's First Amendment
interests.2o2
Curiously, Judge Posner dissented in Alvarez nearly two decades
after holding in Desnick that audiovisual recordings in a private eye
197Id. at 80, 85.
198 Glik, 655 F.3d at 84-85 (reasoning that the "terseness" of a case recognized as directly
on point "implicitly speaks to fundamental and virtually self-evident nature of the First
Amendment's protections in this area").
199 Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 6o8.
200 Id. at 586.
2o Id. at 603-04. As the court explained, it is a "bedrock principle" of the First
Amendment that the government may not limit expression based on its "message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content," and that such restrictions are "presumptively invalid"
and subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 603 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
202 Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 6o5-o8. The court did not decide whether the recording of a
private conversation would be protected by the First Amendment, but admittedly did state
that if the Illinois statute had contained a provision limiting its prohibitions to recordings
of such private conversations, "the link to the State's privacy justification would be much
stronger." Id. at 607-o8.
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care center were not unlawful.203 His opinions can be reconciled,
however, by considering the constitutional avoidance undertones
persistent throughout his dissent in Alvarez. Judge Posner reasoned
that a court's action of striking down a statute on constitutional
grounds should be "rare and solemn" and done with "reluctance" so
that such invalidation happens only when there is clear mandatory
authority, strong evidence, or "an overwhelming gut feeling, that the
statute has intolerable consequences. '"24
Judge Posner's dissent underscores the judicial hesitation to
recognize expansive First Amendment protections for newsgathering
in the face of less-than-clear Supreme Court guidance. Unsure of the
proper scope for this "antecedent" right,2o5 the Court has left several
large holes for lower courts to muddle through. Rather than continue
to rely on lower courts reluctant to patch these holes, the public's right
to receive should be recognized as a protective shield over the right to
gather newsworthy information from public speakers.20 6 Ideally, the
Supreme Court would recognize the right to receive as a constitutional
matter. However, this Note proposes that Congress, a political body
with its own prerogative to interpret the Constitution,o7 should
203 Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1353-54. Recall that Judge Posner decided the electronic
surveillance issue in Desnick by relying on a statutory provision that allowed the
interception of an oral communication when one party consents to the interception. Id. at
1353.
204 Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 6o9 (Posner, J., dissenting). The dissent considered the chilling
effect of the court's holding on conversations between the police and private citizens, the
privacy implications, the detrimental effect on the effectiveness of law enforcement, and
the impracticality of police officers issuing a dispersal order anytime they wished to have a
private conversation in a public space. Id. at 614.
205 Id. at 595-96 (majority opinion).
2o6 See infra Part IV. A full statement of this right would be a "right to receive information
regarding matters of legitimate public concern uttered by public speakers." For the reader's
convenience, hereinafter this right will be stated simply as the "right to receive."
207 Congress has the constitutional power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution... all [] Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States," U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, and to "enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions" of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 5. The First Amendment's freedom of the press clause was long ago incorporated as
a 'liberty" protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931). While Congress may not recognize a new constitutional
right, it may enforce rights already guaranteed by any legitimate means reasonably
calculated to reach a particular end. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997)
(agreeing that Congress may pass legislation enforcing the people's First Amendment right
to freely exercise their religion); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) ("Let the
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recognize the public's right to receive information of legitimate public
concern uttered by public speakers by amending the Wiretap Act to
allow interceptions of oral communications in just-press-record
scenarios.
IV. THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO RECEIVE TRUMPS THE
PRIVACY INTERESTS OF PUBLIC SPEAKERS ENGAGED IN
COMMUNICATION OF LEGITIMATE PUBLIC CONCERN
The Supreme Court has recognized a right to receive information
as a corollary to the right of expression since the World War II era.208
This right to receive, which had its genesis in Martin v. City of
Struthers,2o9 has evolved to make the primary right of expression
more secure2 10 and has been applied in situations too numerous to
discuss in one article.211 This right to receive should be viewed as
interconnected with but independent from the rights of expression or
publication; the rights should be regarded as independent co-
equals.212 As such, the right to receive should operate to elevate
protections of newsgathering activities to the same level already
afforded by protections for publication.213 The right to receive should
trump any right to privacy held by a public speaker because of the
great public benefit of receiving information that will assist people in
making informed choices and avoiding harm, along with the
diminished expectation of privacy that comes with the territory of
being in the public eye.
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.").
208 See Susan Nevelow Mart, The Right to Receive Information, 95 L. LIBR. J. 175, 175
(2003).
209 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
210 Nevelow Mart, supra note 208, at 175.
21, Id. at 187.
212 See First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) ("[T]he First
Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to
prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the
public may draw.").
213 See supra Part III.B.2.
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Ideally, courts would recognize this right to receive as protecting
the right of an individual to press the "record" button when she finds
herself privy to communications regarding matters of legitimate
public concern. Nevertheless, there is a simpler and more
straightforward solution. Recognizing the Supreme Court's reluctance
to decide constitutional questions,214 Congress should amend the
Wiretap Act to add an exception permitting the surreptitious
recording of communications regarding matters of legitimate public
concern when that person (1) is lawfully on the premises where the
recording takes place, is not committing a crime, and is not otherwise
violating a relationship of trust and confidence;
(2) reasonably recognizes, at the time of the interception, that the
communication pertains to a matter of legitimate public concern; (3)
distributes the information for the public's benefit; and (4) does not
seek to use the communication in an act of bribery or extortion.215 This
amendment would reflect the constitutional principles of Martin and
its progeny.
214 This hesitation, reflected in Judge Posner's dissent in Alvarez, is known as the
constitutional avoidance canon. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 501
(1979); United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407
(19o9). Because the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts has received mixed
reviews concerning First Amendment protections, Congress should preempt the Court by
creating an exception to the Wiretap Act. Concededly, former Solicitor General Ken Starr
said the current Court is the "most free speech court in American history," as reflected in
decisions striking down statutes aimed at criminalizing video depictions of animal cruelty
and protecting the picketing of military funerals. A. E. Dick Howard, Out of Infancy: The
Roberts Court at Seven, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 76, 81 (2012) (citing United States v.
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (20o) and Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218-19 (2011),
respectively). However, an opposing view sees these cases as "slam dunk[s]" that
presumably would have been upheld by any court, and scholars as prominent as Erwin
Chemerinsky take a more cynical view of the Roberts Court as pushing an ideological
agenda that advocates an expansive view of the First Amendment only when applied to
strike down restrictions on spending by corporations and the wealthy. Id. (citing Erwin
Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIz. L. REv. 724, 734 (2011)). The two
approaches have been reconciled by proposing that the Roberts Court has taken a view of
the First Amendment different than traditionally understood by conceptualizing free
speech as a right in political liberty, not political equality. Id. (citing Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 144, 161 (2010)).
215 As a reminder, this Note directly addresses only Congress's role in amending the
Wiretap Act. State legislatures should follow suit, however, by amending their own wiretap
statutes to reflect the proposed solution provided herein. See supra note 64 for a
breakdown of state statutes.
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A. Constitutional Basis for an Exception to Liability Under Wiretap
Statutes
The public's First Amendment right to receive provides the
groundwork for an amendment to the nation's wiretap statutes that
would allow private citizens to intercept oral communications
regarding matters of legitimate public concern and to disseminate that
information to the public. In the seminal case of Martin, an ordinance
in an Ohio city made it illegal to knock on the door of a home for the
purpose of distributing literature.216 A woman was convicted under
that ordinance for distributing religious materials door to door.217
Recognizing a right to receive information as a corollary to the right to
distribute it, the Court struck down the ordinance as an
unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment.213 The Court
weighed the right of the "individual householder to determine whether
he is willing to receive her message" on the same side of the scale as
the distributor.219 Recognizing that trespass laws protected the
homeowner from unwanted guests after their lack of consent had been
216 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142 (1943). Although Martin was the first case
to explicitly recognize a right to receive, the Court's decision in Grosjean v. Am. Press Co.,
decided seven years earlier, contained strong underpinnings for such a right. In that case,
the Court struck down a license tax on newspapers as unconstitutional under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Grosjean v. Am. Press. Co., 297 U.S. 233, 240, 251 (1936). The
Court analogized this tax to English "taxes on knowledge" levied against newspapers to
suppress speech that was objectionable to England's monarchical government, which the
Framers of the Constitution used as a basis for adopting the First Amendment's freedom of
the press. Id. at 246, 248 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court reasoned that the
English taxes-and, by logical extension, the Louisiana license tax-were targeted at
"prevent[ing], or curtail[ing] the opportunity for, the acquisition of knowledge by the
people in respect of their governmental affairs." Id. at 247. Moreover, the Court stated that
the taxes put at stake "an informed and enlightened public opinion." Id. The Court rested
its analysis on the proposition that "[t]he evils to be prevented were ... any action of the
government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public
matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of
their rights as citizens." Id. at 249-50 (emphasis added) (quoting 2 THOMAS MCINTYRE
COOLEY & WALTER CARRINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATWE POWER OF THE STATE OF THE AMERICAN UNION 886 (8th ed.
1927)). See also, Christopher Witteman, Information Freedom, a Constitutional Value for
the 21st Century, 36 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 145, 203 (2013) (discussing
Grosjean).
217 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142 (1943).
218 Id. at 149.
219Id. at 143.
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communicated, the Court concluded that "[f]reedom to distribute
information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive it is so
clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting aside
reasonable police and health regulations of time and manner of
distribution, it must be fully preserved."220
Moreover, the Court has recognized the public's right to receive
information in their capacity as consumers as a justification for
compelled disclosure requirements in the commercial speech
context. 22 1 The Court articulated this right in Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona:
The listener's interest is substantial: the consumer's
concern for the free flow of commercial speech often
may be far keener than his concern for urgent political
dialogue. Moreover, significant societal interests are
served by such speech. Advertising, though entirely
commercial, may often carry information of import to
significant issues of the day. And commercial speech
serves to inform the public of the availability, nature,
and prices of products and services, and thus performs
an indispensable role in the allocation of resources in a
free enterprise system. In short, such speech serves
individual and societal interests in assuring informed
and reliable decisionmaking.222
The Court first recognized the public's right to receive commercial
speech in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council.223 In that case, the Court stated that a consumer's
interest in receiving commercial information may be "keener by far"
than her interest in "the day's most urgent political debate. "224 The
Court ruled that the recipients of pharmaceutical advertising had
standing to assert their First Amendment rights to challenge a
220 Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
221 See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985) (noting that First Amendment protection for commercial speech is "justified
principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides").
222 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (internal citations omitted).
223 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
224 Id. at 763.
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regulation that banned the advertisements.225 Athough the ban was
content-based, it focused on a regulation restricting the conduct of the
speaker but not the recipient. "Freedom of speech presupposes a
willing speaker," the Court stated, "[b]ut where a speaker exists, as is
the case here, the protection afforded is to the communication, to its
source and to its recipients both. '"22 6 The Court noted the "public
interest" that a "free flow of commercial information" produces
economic decisions that are "intelligent and well informed."227 The
Court characterized the right as an "independent right ... to receive
information sought to be communicated" and rejected an argument
that no right exists when the listener could obtain the information by
other means.228
In some circumstances, the public's right to receive is even
broader than the expressive rights of citizens or the right to a free
press. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court focused
on the interests of society at large rather than the expressive rights of
corporations themselves to establish that First Amendment rights
extend to corporations.229 The Court reasoned that the Constitution
frequently protects interests that are broader than the rights of the
parties seeking those protections; namely, "significant societal
interests" protected by the First Amendment.230 The Court thus
concluded, "the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press
and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from
225 Id. at 757.
226 Id. at 756.
227Id. at 765.
228 Id. at 757 n.15 ("We are aware of no general principle that freedom of speech may be
abridged when the speaker's listeners could come by his message by some other means,
such as seeking him out and asking him what it is. Nor have we recognized any such
limitation on the independent right of the listener to receive the information sought to be
communicated.").
229 See First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (reversing a
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision holding that a corporation has First
Amendment protection for its speech only when it can prove that a political issue
"materially affects" its property or assets). The state court had articulated the issue as
"whether and to what extent corporations have First Amendment rights." Id. The Supreme
Court disagreed with that formulation of the issue, refraining it more broadly as whether
the challenged statute infringed an expression that the First Amendment was designed to
ensure. Id.
230 Id. at 776.
[Vol. 10:1
STRAYER
limiting the stock of information from which members of the public
may draw. "231
Similarly, the Court raised the right to receive in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission as a justification for its landmark, yet
widely controversial, decision in 2010 that upheld political spending
by corporations as a mode of expression protected by the First
Amendment.232 Invoking the government accountability function of
free speech and the necessity of citizens' ability to make informed
choices in a representative democracy, the Court reasoned that "[t]he
right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to
reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and
a necessary means to protect it."233
One of the Court's strongest articulations of the right to receive
came in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.2 34 In Red Lion
Broadcasting, the Supreme Court upheld a rule promulgated by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) requiring a broadcast
licensee to give a person or group attacked for expressing views on a
controversial issue of public concern notice of the attack and a
reasonable opportunity to respond over the licensee's airwaves.235 The
Court elevated the rights of viewers and listeners above those of the
broadcasters,23 6 reasoning that the First Amendment protects an
"uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
231 Id. at 783 (emphasis added).
232 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898, 917 (2010).
233 Id. at 898.
234 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
235 Id. at 373, 400-01.
236 Id. at 390 ("It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount."). This analysis of the right to receive came in the context of radio
broadcasting, which the Court noted as a resource the government was entitled to restrict
due to its scarcity. Id. This feature is admittedly not present in the virtually limitless
Internet. Additionally, some question exists regarding Red Lion Broadcasting's continuing
vitality after the Court's decision in Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974). There, the Court struck down a statute requiring newspapers to give a political
candidate news space to reply to criticism in the newspaper's editorial pages. Tornillo, 418
U.S. at 258. The Court concluded that the statute was an unconstitutional attempt by the
government to control the content of the newspaper's editorial pages in violation of the
First Amendment. Id. The Court has never overruled Red Lion Broadcasting, however, and
the decision's articulation of the public's right to receive was not questioned in Tornillo,
which does not even cite Red Lion Broadcasting.
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prevail."237 The Court concluded that "[i]t is the right of the public to
receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other
ideas and experiences," which neither Congress nor the FCC could
restrict .23
The right to receive information has also been recognized by state
courts, legislatures, and common law scholars. In Tornillo v. Miami
Herald Publishing Co., the Supreme Court of Florida upheld a statute
requiring newspapers to give a political candidate news space to reply
to criticism levied on the candidate in the paper's editorial pages
because the public had "a right... to the whole story, rather than half
of it."239 In addition, the Washington State Legislature recognized the
general public's right to health and safety information by enacting a
statute stating that "members of the public have a right to information
necessary for a lay member of the public to understand the nature,
source, and extent of the risk from alleged hazards to the public. '"24o
Even the Restatement (Second) of Torts acknowledges common law
and constitutional principles that "the public has a proper interest in
learning about many matters" and that dissemination of information
"of legitimate public concern" does not constitute an invasion of
privacy. 241
These cases and other sources are important to the surreptitious
recording of information regarding matters of public importance by
public speakers for three reasons. First, the city ordinance in Martin
and the advertising ban in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
criminalized the conduct of the speaker, not the recipient, yet the
Court depended on the value of the recipient's right to receive the
237Red Lion Broad., 395 U.S. at 390.
238 Id.
239 Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 287 So. 2d 78, 87 (Fla. 1973). As noted above, the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of Florida's decision, invalidating the
statute as the government's attempt to control the content of the newspaper's editorial
pages. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). The Court did not,
however, address the portion of the Supreme Court of Florida's opinion recognizing the
right to receive. See Wilfrid C. Rumble, Comment, The FCC's Reliance on Market
Incentives to Provide Diverse Viewpoints on Issues of Public Importance Violates the First
Amendment Right to Receive Critical Information, 28 U.S.F. L. Rev. 793, 8oi-o8 (1994)
(discussing Tornillo and the Supreme Court's "right to receive" cases).
240 WASH. REv. CODE § 4.24.611(2) (2013).
241 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. d (1977).
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information for its holdings.242 Second, like the Wiretap Act, 243 the
statute in Martin was content-neutral as it was aimed at the act of
door-to-door distribution of literature.244 Thus, the right to receive
information is not reserved for restrictions on content-based
information. Finally, the Court in Martin recognized the right to
receive information as a necessary component of the right to
distribute it.245 This was confirmed in Red Lion Broadcasting and
First National Bank of Boston when the Court elevated the right of
the public to receive information of political, social, and moral
importance above the interests of the speakers because it was
necessary for an "uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail. '"246 Indeed, the public's right to a full "stock of
information" goes beyond the rights of the speaker.247 While the right
of expression and the right to receive go hand in hand, the right to
receive should not be viewed as ancillary to the right of expression; the
two rights should be understood as co-equals.243
Thus, the courts and Congress should recognize that the public's
right to receive information of public importance justifies a more
robust intrusion into the arguably private communications of public
speakers when those communications regard matters of legitimate
public concern. The public needs this information to fully engage its
civic duties, not the least of which is voting.249 People rely on
242 See supra notes 216-228 and accompanying text.
243 The Supreme Court has concluded that the Wiretap Act is a content-neutral law of
general applicability. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514,526 (2001).
244 In fact, the Court did not even consider the religious message of the literature despite
the defendant's timely argument. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142 (1943). If
the Court had determined the law was content-based, the First Amendment's freedom of
religion clause would have been implicated.
245 Martin, 319 U.S. at 146-47.
246 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
247 See First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
248 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 757 n.15
(1976) (characterizing the right to receive commercial speech as an "independent right...
to receive the information sought to be communicated" (emphasis added)).
249 See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) ("Without the information provided by
the press most of us and many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to
register opinions on the administration of government generally.").
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information to make decisions about their careers, where to send their
kids to school, where to live, what products to buy, and even where to
purchase their food.25o A free flow of information to the public251
should not be unreasonably impeded absent a countervailing interest
of the utmost degree, which a public speaker's diminished expectation
of privacy does not provide.252
As the Court recognized in Garrison v. State of Louisiana, this
free flow of information is not limited to statements or information
that are made openly when the public speaker knows people are
listening.253 Rather, it reaches to anything germane to an official's
fitness for holding public office, including that which affects the
official's private character.254 At first glance this may seem to be a
"total abrogation of the right to privacy,'"255 but the competing
interests between the First Amendment and the right to be left alone
can be reconciled by the diminished privacy expectations of public
speakers.25 6 Using its own prerogative to interpret the Constitution,
Congress should amend the Wiretap Act to increase protections for
newsgathering in just-press-record scenarios to the same level as
protections for publication. Anchoring this amendment would be the
250 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 (explaining that commercial speech is
needed to make "intelligent and well informed" choices).
251 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (characterizing public officials as
"servants" of the people and reasoning that the "free flow of information to the people"
about those public officials is a "paramount public interest"); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 832 (1974) (quoting Garrison's "free flow of information" language with
approval).
252 See supra Part III.B.i.
253 Garrison, 379 U.S. at 77. The Supreme Court struck down a state criminal defamation
statute as unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Id. In overturning the conviction
of a District Attorney who disparaged eight judges during a press conference, the Court
applied the "actual malice" standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279
(1964), decided the same term, which held that disparaging public remarks about a public
official are defamatory only if they are both false and the speaker knew they were false or
recklessly disregarded whether they were false. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74.
254 Garrison, 379 U.S. at 77.
255 Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34, 42 (Cal. 1971) (en bane) ("[T]he
rights guaranteed bythe First Amendment do not require total abrogation of the right to
privacy."), holding overruled by Gates v. Discovery Comme'ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552, 555 (Cal.
2004).
256 See supra Part III.B.I.
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constitutional right of the public to receive information of legitimate
public concern reflected in Martin and its progeny.
B. Policy Support for an Exception to Liability Under the Wiretap Act
Beyond these constitutional protections, Congress should amend
the Wiretap Act to permit the interception of oral communications in
just-press-record scenarios as a means to reduce the potential for
collusive corruption in government bodies-or to maintain the lack
thereof. The Supreme Court's commitment to "uninhibited, robust,
and wide open" debate on matters of public importance257 is well
founded as data suggest a strong correlation between a free press and
a lack of corruption in society.258 The necessary link is transparency,
which "depends crucially on freedom of the press and expression. '"259
The logic is commonsensical: when public speakers understand that
their actions can and will be laid bare before the public, they will be
far more likely to conduct their stewardship in a more publicly
beneficial way.260 A free press is not merely necessary to establish a
society free from high levels of corruption but is necessary to maintain
that status.261 One study showed that a free press had the greatest
correlation with low corruption among four institutional factors
including a free press, a strong civil society, political opposition, and
an independent judiciary.262 A free press is a "demonstrated antidote
257 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001).
258 See Aymo Brunetti & Beatrice Weder, A Free Press is Bad Newsfor Corruption, 87 J.
PUB. ECON. 1801, 1810, 1820 (2003); Daniel Lederman et al., Accountability and
Corruption: Political Institutions Matter, 17 ECON. & POL. 1, 4-5 (2005); Hung-En Sung, A
Convergence Approach to the Analysis of Political Corruption: A Cross-National Study,
38 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 137, 155 (2002); see also Roger P. Alford, A Broken Windows
Theory of International Corruption, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1253, 1269 (2012).
259 Lederman, supra note 258, at 4-5.
26o Id. at 5 ("Freedom of press, so that right- and wrong-doings on the part of the
government can be publicized, tends to reduce the informational problem between
principals (citizens) and agents (governments), thus improving governance.").
26 1 See Sung, supra note 258, at 146-47.
262 Id. at 155.
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to widespread political corruption, '"263 a proposition the Supreme
Court has supported.264
Aymo Brunetti and Beatrice Weder identify two forms of
corruption: extortive and collusive.265 While a free press is
instrumental in combating both forms, it is absolutely critical to
fighting collusive corruption. The press provides an alternative
channel for battling extortive corruption since the private actor being
extorted may either seek redress through internal accountability
controls housed in the government system itself or, if the internal
controls are ineffective due to delay or otherwise, the private actor
may report the extortion to the press.26 6 Brunetti and Weder posit,
however, that a free press is likely the most effective control
mechanism for collusive corruption because of journalists' incentives
to expose all wrongdoing. 67 Indeed, if a free press is not permitted to
uncover collusion without fear of prosecution, then who will? As
Brunetti and Weder suggest, a "substantial danger" exists that those
overseeing internal controls built into the government system-useful
in fighting extortive corruption, to be sure-will be party to the
collusion and "get a share of the pie."26 3 Free and independent
journalists are needed to protect against this sort of collusive
corruption.
Permitting a person to record oral communications in just-press-
record scenarios would aid the fight against both forms of corruption,
but would prove especially useful to combat collusive corruption. Take
Mr. Romney's "47 percent" speech, for example. Although not
263 Id.
264 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) ('The Constitution specifically selected the
press ... to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs. Thus the press serves
and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental
officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people
responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve.").
265 Brunetti & Weder, supra note 258, at 1804. Extortive corruption is defined as a
government official exercising discretion to refuse or delay a service in her power to grant
in order to procure a rent, otherwise known as a bribe. Id. In collusive corruption, the
private actor is in on the scheme: the government official and the private actor collaborate,
with the government official turning a blind eye to the private actor's undesirable conduct
in exchange for a bribe. Id. at 18o5.
266 Brunetti & Weder, supra note 258, at 1804.
267 Id. at 1805.
268 Id.
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technically an act of collusive corruption as it has been defined here,
the speech to private donors could be understood as a quid pro quo. A
reasonable person could certainly understand the intended message
as something to the effect of, "If you donate money to my campaign, I
will be sure to advocate for policies in your best interest. Who needs
that other 47 percent anyway, right?" What about the taxi cab driver
who picks up a fare plus a little extra from loose-lipped government
officials orchestrating a back-room deal? This is a textbook
opportunity for a free press to smoke out collusion. 269 If not the press,
then whom?27o
More than just a whistleblower, however, a free press has the
power to effect significant change. Watergate is the quintessential
example, when determined Washington Post reporters Bob
Woodward and Carl Bernstein uncovered a scandal that prompted a
Senate investigation and the resignation of President Richard
Nixon.271 Although the current state of First Amendment law provides
269 Presumably, the taxi cab driver, waiter, or custodian in these just-press-record
scenarios could simply tell someone what they heard without recording the
communications. However, this is an inadequate alternative to a recording of the
communication given the substantially increased credibility and authenticity of the
communication if presented to the public in the speaker's own words.
270 "Press" used here is meant to encompass traditional print and broadcast reporters, as
well as citizen journalists who capture acts of collusive corruption. See supra note 140.
271 MICHAEL EMERY ET AL., THE PRESS AND AMERICA: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE
MASS MEDIA 440-41 (9th ed. 2000). A less known example occurred in 1998, when the
Post published a multi-part story about a systemic culture that led the D.C. police
department to the highest rate of police-shooting fatalities in the country. LEONARD
DOWNIE JR. & ROBERT G. KAISER, THE NEWS ABOUT THE NEWS: AMERICAN JOURNALISM IN
PERIL 42-43 (2003). The series prompted D.C. police leaders to institute new mandatory
training for its entire force. Id. at 50. As a result, the number of police shootings in D.C. fell
from thirty-two in 1998 to eleven in 1999, with the number of fatalities dropping during
that time period from twelve to four. Id. In 2000, the D.C. police killed only one person. Id.
A free press is not merely an ideal forced on the people by First Amendment purists.
Rather, the public craves complete and reliable information. It is true that news
consumption has been dropping for more than a decade in the United States. See Trends in
News Consumption: 1991-2012: In Changing News Landscape, Even Television is
Vulnerable, PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE &THE PRESS (Sept. 27, 2012),
http://www.people-press.org/2012/09/27/in-changing-news-landscape-even-television-
is-vulnerable (explaining that newspaper and broadcast news consumption has fallen over
the past decade while news consumption via mobile devices and social networks has made
up some of the difference). Americans are spoiled by twenty-four-hour news cycles, access
to news on their mobile phones, and broad First Amendment protections. A recent episode
in China illustrates how willing a deprived public is to fight for access to information. In
January 2013, Chinese journalists working for the Southern Weekend newspaper went on
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much wider protections for U.S. citizens than other countries
throughout the world, the U.S. government should not soon forget
that "[t]he best accountability reporting reverberates through the
culture, reminding malefactors everywhere that they may get caught
and exposed. This is what freedom of the press should inspire. '"272
C. Proposed Amendment to the Wiretap Act
To reflect this ideal, grounded in constitutional principles and
statistical data, Congress should amend the Wiretap Act to add an
exception allowing a person to record the oral communications of
public speakers engaged in communication of legitimate public
concern when certain conditions are met. The exception would
prevent liability for the audiovisual recording of oral communications
uttered by public speakers when the interceptor (1) is lawfully on the
premises where the recording takes place, is not committing any other
criminal act, and is not otherwise violating a duty of trust and
confidence; (2) reasonably recognizes, at the time of the interception,
that the communication pertains to a matter of legitimate public
concern; (3) distributes the information for the public's benefit; and
(4) does not seek to use the communication in an act of bribery or
extortion.273
strike to protest "overbearing censorship by provincial propaganda officials." Edward
Wong, Demonstrators Rally to Protest Censorship, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 8, 2013, at 4.
In a show of support, hundreds of demonstrators gathered outside the newspaper's office
in Guangzhou, China, including celebrities and one person carrying a banner that stated:
"Get rid of censorship. The Chinese people want freedom." Id.
272 DOWNIE & KAISER, supra note 271, at 51.
273 The text of the proposed amendment is:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of
law to intercept an oral communication uttered by a public speaker where such
person reasonably recognizes at the time of the interception that the
communication pertains to a matter of legitimate public concern and the person
distributes the information for public benefit, provided that the person is not
trespassing, committing other criminal acts, or violating a duty of trust and
confidence when such interception occurs. (a) This exception shall not apply if
the person who intercepts the oral communication thereafter uses that
communication to seek commercial gain or financial benefit through an act of
bribery or extortion. "Public speaker" shall be defined to include public officials,
candidates for public office, and private persons who insert themselves into
public affairs and communicate about matters of public concern.
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This proposed exception would contribute to the "uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail," would add
to the "stock of information" available to the public in making
important decisions, and would reflect the right of the public to
receive information of legitimate public concern, a right that stands
independent as co-equal to the right of expression.274 It also accounts
for concerns that the expansion of the First Amendment in this regard
would allow reporters and citizen journalists with smartphones to run
amuck, breaking all manner of laws and infringing a public speaker's
legitimate privacy interests with impunity.
First, the requirement that a person not be trespassing or
otherwise breaking the law when recording the oral communication
recognizes the holding of Cohen that the press is not exempt from
generally applicable laws.275 As the Court in that case reasoned, "[t]he
press may not with impunity break and enter an office or dwelling to
gather news" or publish copyrighted material without regard to the
copyright laws.276 Likewise, in concluding that the ACLU would likely
succeed on a First Amendment claim in a case analogous to the just-
press-record scenarios, the Seventh Circuit considered it important
that proposed interceptors of police activity would have a legal right to
be in the location where the recording was made and would not
disrupt safety or the public order through such interceptions.277
274 See First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
275 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (199). But see Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment, which often is considered a
constitutional basis for a right to privacy, "protects people, not places"). However, Katz
dealt with an electronic recording device installed in a phone booth by law enforcement. Id.
at 348. The Fourth Amendment applies only to unreasonable searches by the government.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Katz, 389 U.S. at 350. Indeed, Katz itself contemplated that the
Constitution does not protect a general right of privacy between private persons, but that
"a person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other people-is ... left
largely to the law of the individual States." Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51 (footnote omitted). Of
course, this Note addresses communications not by private persons but public speakers
who have a diminished expectation of privacy. See supra Part III.B.i.
276 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
277ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 6o6 (7th Cir. 2012). In just-press-record scenarios, the
taxi cab driver who records the conversation of government officials certainly would not be
trespassing in her own cab. The custodian would not be trespassing in the union leader's
office while performing his job of emptying the wastebaskets. The presence of the waiter at
the booth where corporate officers discuss a factory relocation that would be devastating to
a community is not unauthorized. Lastly, the recording of a private campaign fundraiser,
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Second, requiring the interceptor to reasonably recognize the
relevance of the speaker's communication to a matter of legitimate
public concern at the time she intercepts it eliminates the possibility
of fishing expeditions. This objective standard would protect the First
Amendment rights of the interceptor and the public, while also
protecting the legitimate privacy interests of the speaker. To that end,
the smartphone-wielding potential interceptor would not be allowed
to surreptitiously record all of the speaker's communication in the
hope of capturing something of public importance while at the same
time recording much that is entirely private. While this might limit the
content that is ultimately recorded-in some instances the
communication may end before the interceptor has the opportunity to
press record-such a limitation is necessary to ensure the First
Amendment does not eviscerate all privacy interests by allowing
recorders to intercept information personal to the speaker.
Lastly, limiting the manner in which the recorder may use the
information prevents the recorder from using the right to receive as a
pretext for improper private benefit. 278 The interceptor may not use
the information for collusion, extortion, or bribery. This provision is
modeled after another section of the Wiretap Act that provides an
exception for the interception of unencrypted satellite transmissions
when (1) those interceptions are disseminated to a broadcaster for
transmission to the general public and (2) the interception is not done
with the purpose of realizing "direct or indirect commercial advantage
or private financial gain."279
This element implicates the interceptor's potentially mixed
motivations for pressing the record button. An analogy may be drawn
from courts' analysis of public employee speech. The Seventh Circuit
has reasoned that a public employee's speech "born of pure personal
interest" does not pertain to a matter of public concern but mixed
motives that include some personal and some public reasons does not
whether carried out by an event patron or a member of the catering staff, is not conducted
by a trespasser.
278 This would not prevent a person from selling the information for private financial gain
outside the bribery or extortion context. See Chrysanthe E. Vassiles, Note, Checkbook
Journalism: It May Involve Free Speech Interests but It is Not Free; Can Witnesses Be
Prohibited from Selling Their Stories to Media Under the First Amendment?, 56 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1619, 1644 (1995) (arguing that a statute prohibiting eye witnesses from selling
information to the news media is unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
279 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(b) (2014). This provision provided the general idea behind, but does
not directly parallel, the proposed exception. Indeed, questions have been raised about the
constitutionality of statutes such as § 2511(4)(b). See generally Vassiles, supra note 278.
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lose protection.23o The Ninth Circuit has similarly concluded that
personal employment concerns that are "intertwined" with a matter of
public concern may still, on balance, pertain to a matter of public
concern.23 1 "Mixed speech"-that is, speech that involves both public
and private matters-may be protected so long as it "touches on a
matter of public concern. '"2 82 By inverse reasoning, it is logical to
condition protection for interceptors in just-press-record scenarios on
the distribution of the information for the public's benefit. This need
not be an interceptor's sole motivation, but it would prevent her from
receiving protection for an act of bribery or extortion. Thus, the
public's right to receive would be promoted without allowing
interceptors to exploit a public speaker's legitimate interest in
maintaining privacy.
An argument may be raised that allowing the surreptitious
recording of public speaker communications in just-press-record
scenarios would chill public speakers from engaging in open and frank
communications regarding important decisions affecting the
community. This is an important concern and one that is built into the
narrow amendment proposed herein. First, the amendment applies
only to oral communications by public speakers who already have a
280 Miller v. Jones, 444 F.3d 929, 937-39 (7th Cir. 2oo6) (holding that a Milwaukee police
officer who openly opposed the merger of the Police Athletic League and the Boys and Girls
Club had spoken as a citizen upon a matter of public concern). The court analyzed the
speaker's motivation and circumstances under the "context" prong of the Connick's
"content, form, and context" test. See id. at 935, 937; Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48. The
court reasoned that where there is "no suggestion of public motivation," the statement is
more likely to involve purely personal reasons, but where the statement arose out of the
exercise of the employee's discretionary functions and independent judgment, he was more
likely to be speaking as a citizen upon matters of public concern. Miller, 444 F.3d at 937.
28, Pool v. VanRheen, 297 F.3d 899, 908 (9th Cir. 2002) (construing Connick and Rankin
as suggesting that the employee's speech motive is a factor to be considered under the
context prong and concluding that a female African American police lieutenant who was
critical of the police department's treatment of minorities at a meeting covered by the
media and was demoted for her actions had spoken on a matter of public concern). The
court rejected the defendant's argument that Pool had "turn[ed] her job problems into a
cause celebre" because her commitment to race and gender equality during her whole
career demonstrated that even if personal reasons were a motivation for her speech, her
motives were mixed. Id.
282 Banks v. Wolfe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888, 894 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that
where an aide was passed over for several teaching positions, a complaint letter she sent to
the school's board of education about the school's hiring practices fell into the "mixed
speech category" because she also testified that the school's broader hiring policies and
procedures were her "primary concern").
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diminished expectation of privacy. It does not apply to wire or
electronic communications, nor does it apply to oral communications
uttered by private persons. Second, the amendment should not chill
public speakers from engaging in frank discussions with trusted
confidants. The amendment reflects the D.C. Circuit's en bane
decision in Boehner that the First Amendment does not protect
persons with a duty of trust and confidence from sanctions for
intercepting the communications of those to whom they owe the duty
or for disclosing the contents of such an interception.23 Public
speakers could presumably take precautions by contractually
establishing this duty of trust and confidence with their aids and other
agents. Finally, public speakers should not be chilled from engaging in
frank communications in a controlled environment-e.g. behind
closed doors in their personal office or a private conference room-
because the exception would not permit the interception of their
communications by anyone not in that environment.
In a society in which nearly every member owns or has access to a
recording device as small and unassuming as a cell phone, a public
speaker should be on notice that another person may record his
sensitive but publicly important conversations. When he is aware or
should be aware of that person's presence, he should not be allowed to
hide behind wiretap laws. The First Amendment demands as much
through the public's right to receive, and Congress should demand the
same by amending the Wiretap Act to add an exception allowing the
interception of oral communications uttered by public speakers when
the interceptor (1) is lawfully on the premises where the recording
takes place, is not otherwise committing a crime, and is not otherwise
violating a duty of trust and confidence; (2) reasonably recognizes, at
the time of the interception, that the communication pertains to a
matter of legitimate public concern;
(3) distributes the information for the public's benefit; and (4) does
not seek to use the communication in an act of bribery or extortion.
V. CONCLUSION
Two damaging consequences result when reporters and citizen
journalists are not permitted to record the oral communications of
public speakers in just-press-record scenarios. First, a lack of
transparency in society's centers of power may produce a potential for
283 See supra note 134 for a discussion of Boehner v. McDermott, 484 F.3d 573, 58o-8i
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
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collusion that could harm the general public. Second, that same public
could be deprived of information needed to make informed, intelligent
choices about many of life's major and more routine matters. The
Wiretap Act as currently drafted is out of date with regard to
advancements in modern audiovisual technology, susceptible to
variant judicial interpretations depending on the jurisdiction, and
adds to its complexity with myriad vaguely defined exceptions.284
These features of the Act endanger the First Amendment rights of the
press, the rights of reporters and citizen journalists to gather news,
and the public's right to receive information.
These First Amendment rights outweigh the privacy interests
protected by the Wiretap Act when the intercepted oral
communications are uttered by public speakers whose positions in the
public eye diminish their expectations of privacy.235 While a public
speaker retains a legitimate privacy interest in certain personal
communications, that interest decreases as First Amendment
protection for the publication of information regarding that
communication increases when it pertains to a matter of legitimate
public concern.23 6 The "prerequisite" to a right of publication2s7-
newsgathering-deserves similar protection. When generally
applicable laws like the Wiretap Act have more than incidental effects
on newsgathering activities, Congress must recognize that general
protections for newsgathering and the public's right to receive raise
constitutional protections for newsgathering to the same level as
protections for publication. 33
As James Madison recognized, the line between the abuse and
proper use of the press is a fine one, and one cannot be found without
the other.289 However, the public's right to receive places the
284 See supra Part II.
285 See supra Part III.B.i.
286 See supra Parts III.A and III.B.2.
28 7 See Easton, supra note 136, at 1140.
288 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 681 (1972) ("Nor is it suggested that news gathering [sic] does not qualify for First
Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the
press could be eviscerated.").
289 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1967) ("As James Madison said, 'Some degree
of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing, and in no instance is this more
true than in that of the press."').
2014]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
interception of oral communications uttered by public speakers in
just-press-record scenarios squarely on the "proper use" side of the
line. The Supreme Court has recognized that the public has a right to
inquire, a right to hear, and a right to a complete stock of
information.29o Put another way, the public has a right to know about
matters that affect their daily lives and influence their decisions about
where to shop, where to send their kids to school, where to live, and
for whom to vote. Congress should amend the Wiretap Act to permit
reporters and citizen journalists to surreptitiously record the oral
communications of public speakers when those communications
pertain to a matter of legitimate public concern. Public speakers who
willingly put themselves in the public eye should not be permitted to
hide behind wiretap statutes when a gaffe like Mr. Romney's "47
percent" speech threatens to knock them down a few points in the
election poll. The public, and the journalists who serve that public,
deserve no less.
290 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010); First Nat'l
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
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